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ABSTRACT 
 
Pathos and Policy: The Power of Emotions in Shaping Perceptions of International 
Relations. (August 2005) 
J. Mark Skorick, B.A., Pepperdine University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Charles F. Hermann 
   
Current approaches to foreign policy decision making and international conflict 
have ignored the role of emotions as variables influencing foreign policy choices. 
However, a growing area of political research suggests that emotions are of critical 
importance to many aspects of political life. Predominant foreign policy decision making 
models currently attend to either rational calculations or ‘cold’ cognitive processes and 
heuristics. These models provide little theoretical space for propositions about how 
enduring and intense emotions such as hatred and fear influence perceptions and 
interpretations of interstate conflict. In this paper we propose a model which addresses 
this deficiency in foreign policy decision making research. A theory of emotions is 
introduced and integrated into the existing research on foreign policy decision making. 
Hypotheses pertaining to the influence of negative emotions on information processing 
and choice in international relations are derived from the model and tested in a multi-
method setting. Findings are reported and discussed within the framework of existing 
empirical research on process-oriented models of foreign policy decision making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Let's not forget that the little emotions are the great captains of our lives and we obey 
them without realizing it.  ~Vincent Van Gogh, 1889 
 
 
It often seems that the study of international relations has somehow divorced 
itself from the passion to fundamental the struggles undertaken by states, people, and 
organizations to survive and achieve their goals. While the abstractions necessary to 
make generalizations about foreign policy and the relations between states often require 
analysts to “focus on the facts,” the practice of doing so often leads researchers 
wondering how the vitality and vibrancy of hotly contested issues, for which some will 
even surrender their very lives, is drained away from the material in question. The desire 
to simplify a field of study which is, by its very nature, amazingly elaborate and 
complex, often leads students of international relations to ignore that which gives life to 
politics: emotion. 
Consider the following scenario: This morning a student woke up to news of 
violent protests in the Middle East over US support of Israel. It seems that a number of 
innocent bystanders were killed when a grenade was tossed into market in Tel Aviv. The 
television relays graphic images of screaming men and women, a soldier rushing a 
bloodied child to an ambulance, a dazed and bandaged teenager sitting on a curb while  
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chaos flows around her. The student presses the remote and switches the channel, 
pondering the merits of breakfast. A heated debate between two politicians is taking 
place on CNN. It is impossible to discern the nature of the debate as both politicians are 
speaking--nearly shouting—at each other at the same time. The moderator’s feeble 
attempt to restore order is drowned out by a cacophony of two. The student switches the 
channel again. More 9/11 stuff. She turns the TV off, opting to not watch, yet again, the 
clip of that plane flying into the building.  
Her appetite suddenly gone, the student drives to school, switching on the radio 
while she waits in traffic listening to frustrated drivers honk at the idiot ahead who has 
never learned how to make a left hand turn without a turn signal. The radio provides 
little respite. A meeting last night at the civic center erupted in argument as townsfolk, 
angry over the planned building of a Wal-Mart and the portent of job losses to come, 
denounced the city council in less than eloquent fashion, vowing to vote each and every 
one of them out of office. The news continues. Hurricanes have devastated several 
Caribbean islands. A group of senators in some remote state are vowing to block the 
nomination of a district court judge over his stance on abortion. Elsewhere, troops are 
being deployed; interviewed family members are stoically proud but obviously anxious. 
The US war in Iraq is discussed. Analogies are drawn to the quagmire of Vietnam and 
the internal backlashes of the 70s. Iraqi’s are interviewed and the results are mixed. 
Some are hopeful. Many are angry.  
The student attends her first class of the day, Introduction to International 
Relations, where she spends an hour and twenty minutes taking notes on a lecture about 
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general sources of international conflict. Levels of analysis are discussed. State and 
systemic causes are compared. She writes the words, “distribution of power,” “rational,” 
“hegemonic,” and “cognition” more times that she cares to remember. A lively debate 
erupts over the merits of the current administration’s policy in the Middle East, arousing 
her interest. But the professor is quick to point out that this class is about descriptive 
rather than normative characteristics of international relations. The lecture continues. 
More concepts, theories, data and abstractions. 
That emotions are an important part of the human experience requires little proof.  
Classical references to the influence of emotions abound in both western and eastern 
literature and philosophy. The ever-present reality of dealing with an emotion such as 
anger or hate, and the consequences thereof, has been the source of countless 
admonitions and warnings against anger, hatred and resentment. “How much more 
grievous are the consequences of anger than the causes of it,” noted Roman Emperor 
Marcus Aurelius. The Roman philosopher and statesman Seneca observed that "Anger, 
if not restrained, is frequently more hurtful to us than the injury that provokes it." 
Confucius is quoted as having said, “When anger rises, think of the consequences.” 
Shakespeare noted that, “In time we hate that which we often fear.” Modern warnings 
echo such ancient sentiments. 19th century physician and writer Anton Pavlovich 
Chekhov proclaimed that “Love, friendship, respect, will never unite people as much as 
a common hatred for something.” Gandhi observed that, "A man who is swayed by 
negative emotions may have good enough intentions, may be truthful in word, but he 
will never find the Truth."  
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While the bulk of such adages admonish listeners against being overly consumed 
by emotional responses, all assume that feelings can have profound effects on social and 
personal experiences. From a scientific perspective, that emotions play an important role 
in the social interactions of individuals has been established through years of intense 
investigation among social psychologists.  Furthermore, the idea that emotions impact 
the manner in which individuals understand and deal with problems has also produced a 
number of important findings.  But what about the interplay of emotions and politics?   
 A perusal of recent international headlines provides ample evidence that, at least 
from a descriptive perspective, foreign affairs is often characterized by emotionally 
charged content: 
“Iranian supreme leader predicts ‘decades of hatred’ of U.S. over Najaf” (Agence France 
Presse—English, 25 August 2004) 
“Argentina outraged by U.S. official remarks” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 June 2004) 
“Iraqi Kurdish official dismayed at US-UK draft resolution” (BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, 28 May 2004) 
“Romanian president angered at Ukraine’s opening of delta canal” (Agence France 
Presse—English, 26 August 2004) 
“Furious Palestinians set Bush effigies ablaze” (Agence France Presse—English, 16 
April 2004) 
“Kosovo Serb Police ‘infuriated’ by arrival of Albanian colleagues” (BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, 1 May 2004) 
“UN rights forum asks North Korea to admit expert, Pyongyang outraged” (Agence 
France Presse—English, 15 April 2004) 
“Mauritius ‘shocked’ by British move on Chagos controversy” (BBC Monitoring 
International Reports, 9 July 2004) 
“Mosque massacre fuels fires of hate” (Daily Mail (London), 8 April 2004) 
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“Iranians ‘hate U.S. and Bush’: army commander” (Agence France Presse—English, 31 
August 2004) 
“Palestinians angered by U.S. policy shift; White House silent on settlement plan” 
(International Herald Tribune, 23 August 2004) 
 
It has only been within the past decade that any serious attempt to understand 
how emotions such as anger, hate, compassion, and fear impact politics, with the handful 
of studies which have addressed this phenomenon focusing primarily on candidate 
evaluation.  To date, few programs of scientific inquiry have attempted to discover how 
emotions impact the realm of foreign policy, and if so, explain what effects emotions 
have on foreign policy processes and outcomes. 
In an article written in 1969, J. David Singer raised the importance of the 
phenomenological nature of political decision making.  Singer suggested that the 
scientific study of international relations could not only be addressed by studies of 
systemic and  state level variables, but also by analyzing and deciphering the manner in 
which individuals’ perceptions and cognitions impinge upon the processes underlying 
policy planning and implementation. Similar approaches to the study of international 
affairs were suggested in articles written by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962) and 
Hermann (1969b).  In the past four decades, foreign policy decision making has become 
a burgeoning field of theoretical inquiry. Broadly speaking, this area of study has sought 
to decipher how decision-makers turn complicated international problems into 
manageable decisions.   
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While no single finding characterizes all of these approaches, they generally 
assume that (1) international decisions are made in an environment that is characterized 
by complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty (Vertzberger 1990; Maoz 1990); (2) 
individual and group decision makers are internally and externally limited in their ability 
to process all of the information about this complex environment (Jervis 1968, 1976; 
Steinbruner 1974); and (3), as a result, decision makers resort to heuristics in order to 
simplify foreign policy problems and eventually make decisions. 
The bulk of the research and findings of such scholars is impressive and growing 
(c.f. Hudson and Vore 1995).  However, the thrust of this research has concerned itself 
with cognitions.  What has been lacking is any systematic attempt at understanding how 
emotions influence foreign policy decision making.  Implicit and overt assumptions 
about the role of emotion in foreign policy seem to ignore not only studies which suggest 
that emotions can have a wide variety of effects on decision making, but also the very 
real intuition shared by humankind that our emotional response to events can greatly 
impact evaluations and choices made on a daily basis. The decision making literature 
concerned with the development of foreign policy has generally taken a dim view on the 
effects of emotion on policy creation and implementation.  Both conventional wisdom 
and academic conclusions suggest that “good” foreign policy is based on reason, 
whereas “bad” foreign policies are usually those influenced by emotion (Hammond 
2000).  
 A recent review of the political science literature which has focused on the role 
of emotions in political studies noted that the vast majority of such studies have centered 
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on personalities or publics (Marcus 1988, 2000; Marcus and Mackuen 1993).  The 
review suggested that the bulk of such research on politics and emotional factors dealt 
with explaining the eccentricities of certain leaders in dealing with political issues as 
well as public choice and commitment to political parties and candidates.  The finding 
that international relations literature has rarely addressed the impact of emotions on 
foreign policy behavior is remarkable because the context within which international 
affairs are conducted is usually considered to be fraught with uncertainty, suspicion, 
danger, threat, and insecurity.  In fact, the fundamental assumptions of Realism and Neo-
realism rest on this depiction of the international environment.  Furthermore, inherent 
within the study of international relations is the acknowledgement that certain conflicts 
between nations are far more intractable than others.  Ethnic conflicts, religious 
grievances, enduring rivalries, and other such hostilities persist over time and with an 
intensity markedly different from other international disputes.  Given the highly 
unpredictable and oftentimes erratic character of the international climate, as well as the 
historically repetitive nature of certain ethnic and religious conflicts of a particularly 
intense nature, the omission of emotional factors in scholarly attempts to describe and 
explain foreign policy behavior may very well be a conspicuous omission. 
 Negative emotions have not been specifically addressed within the international 
relations literature for a number of reasons (c.f. Crawford 2000).  First, the primacy of 
systemic and state-level approaches, in conjunction with the broad reach of rational actor 
models, have held sway among scholars of international relations for a number of years.  
As a result, individual-level approaches to foreign policy analysis have not been as 
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prominent in the field. Second, as the field of foreign policy decision making has 
developed, it has primarily been concerned with resolving the debate between rational 
and cognitive schools of thought.   
Third,  within the cognitive school of foreign policy decision-making, the 
dominant approaches have emphasized intervening cognitive structures or contents—
belief systems, political attitudes, images, cognitive complexity, operational codes, and 
the like—or cognitive processes—heuristic processing, attention, the impact of 
situational variables, framing, etc.  The bewildering array of variables suggested as 
important to the understanding of foreign policy analysis has made political scientists 
skeptical of introducing new factors. Fourth, attitudes and beliefs have been modeled by 
both political scientists and social psychologists as already consisting of an affective or 
emotional component.  That the study of belief systems and political attitudes has been 
an important area of foreign policy decision making research would suggest that there 
any need to address the role of emotions in international relations has already been met.   
Fifth, and related to the last point, social psychological studies of emotions and 
social behavior, from which political scientists have consulted in the development of 
their own decision making theories, have suffered from a long standing difficulty in 
defining emotions, and thus reach anything resembling agreement on the interplay 
between emotions and cognitions.  As will be shown, this problem has directly resulted 
from an attempt to merge two vastly different approaches understanding emotions and 
has influenced the attempts of political scientists to incorporate emotions in their own 
studies.   
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Finally, while we can acknowledge the importance of emotional responses in 
social and political interaction, international relations scholars are justified in asking 
how we might know emotions when we see them?  In part a methodological and 
theoretical question, I will attempt to address this and other questions by outlining the 
development of the study of emotions from social psychology to political science.  In the 
end I will suggest that problems with past approaches to this area of research have led to 
a confusion of theories surrounding emotions and hindered the incorporation of emotions 
in the field of international relations.   
Within the context of foreign policy decision making, several questions about the 
role and importance of emotions require attention.  Do we even need to address emotions 
in our analysis of foreign policy?  Of what use is the study of affect or emotions 
important to our broader understanding of international relations?  Given their 
importance, how do we go about analyzing emotions in a scientific and empirically valid 
manner?  What theoretical frameworks exist which will allow us to understand these 
questions?   
This paper suggests a framework for including emotions in studies of 
international relations and foreign policy decision making.  It proceeds from the 
assumption that critical foreign policy decisions have an emotional component which, 
under certain circumstances, can markedly influence how individuals perceive, make 
sense of, and respond to international events.  Focusing on negative emotions such as 
hate and anger, this study explicates several key assumptions about the nature of 
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emotions.  Before further discussing the framework of this research program, there are 
two important caveats which should be stated at the outset. 
The first caveat is that this study will focus on the effect of negative emotions. 
Since the study of international relations has been concerned with the nature and of 
conflict between states, a more direct relationship is assumed to exist between negative 
emotions (anger, hate, fear, etc.) and potentially conflictual foreign policy choices. This 
is, of course, not to suggest that other emotions do not impact the foreign policy decision 
making process.  However, in focusing on the effect of negative emotions, this analysis 
will (1) limit itself to a single albeit important source of international conflict and (2) 
reduce the number of measures necessary to test appropriate aspects of the theory.   
The second caveat deals with the unit of analysis. While a vast amount of 
research has attended to the analysis of decision making at the elite level (i.e. Cottam 
1986; George 1969, 1980; Hermann 1976, 1977; Herrmann 1984; Holsti 1962, 1967, 
1972, 1976, 1979; Holsti and George 1975; Janis 1983, 1989; Janis and Mann 1977; 
Jervis 1976; Vertzberger 1990; Winter 1992), the findings herein are considered to be 
generalizeable primarily at the public level.  
There are at least two important criticisms which might be leveled at an attempt 
to generalize from the experimental findings reported here to the level of elite decision 
making. First, it could be argued that elite decision makers avoid showing emotions in 
public in order to reassure their constituents that they are able to adequately deal with 
intricate decision making problems in a rational manner. It may be the case the elites 
who display emotions publicly harm their chances of staying in office.  
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Howard Dean’s Iowa concession speech in January of 2004, which was 
characterized by Dean loudly and energetically listing the states which his supporters 
would win, is one recent example of an emotional outburst which resulted in political 
harm to the leader. In Dean’s case, his Iowa speech is seen by many as a pivotal turning 
point in his eventual failure to achieve the Democratic nomination (Gay 2004). In 1972, 
Democratic Presidential candidate Edmund Muskie held a press conference during 
which he appeared to break down in tears while accusing a newspaper of defaming his 
wife’s reputation. As with the Dean outburst, Muskie’s public display of emotion is cited 
as the reason he lost the Democratic nomination. As William Schneider on CNN’s 
“Inside Politics” (1/22/04) noted of the Muskie incident, “A man crying? How 
unpresidential.” 
Second, rather than being effected by emotional incidents within the foreign 
policy environment, it is possible that in fact leaders are skilled in using emotions to 
advance their own political agendas by arousing anxiety, anger, or fear among their 
constituencies.  In 1988 the Bush campaign was accused of using this tactic by running 
an advertisement which accused rival Dukakis of giving weekend passes to convicted 
murderers. The ad, which focused on the African American William Horton, was 
denounced by opponents as a deliberate attempt to connect fear and racial anxiety to the 
Dukakis campaign. Most recently, US President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair have been accused of inciting fears that state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iraq, 
also were in possession of weapons of mass destruction.  Critics charged that both 
administrations played on fear, as well as anger associated with the World Trade Center 
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attacks of 2001, in order to justify war against Iraq. As one observer has noted, “With 
today’s politicians, of both parties, we can’t help wondering if they ever had a genuine 
emotion, one not carefully shaped and molded and placed before the public for political 
purposes, in their lives” (Bowman 2002). 
It should be noted however that this caveat is not meant to suggest that elite 
decision makers necessarily differ from the general public in terms of the form of 
emotional responses available to them as pertaining to foreign policy events. The 
suggestion here is that, in regards to the findings reported within this research program, 
the generalizability is restricted to the level of the general public. 
 The subsequent sections set forth the framework of a research program designed 
to address the question of how emotions influence foreign policy. More precisely, 
working from extant literature across several disciplines and utilizing a multi-method 
approach, this study will attempt to develop a model which describes how negative 
emotions influence the interpretation and processing of important foreign policy events. 
Beginning with a review of the literature relevant to the study of emotions in foreign 
policy decision making, including the study of affect in social psychology, and pertinent 
research from the field of international relations, a general theory will be proposed. The 
theory will explicate the relationship between emotion and cognition and their 
interactive effect on foreign policy decision making process and choice. 
 The fourth section of this work will consist of a discussion of the hypotheses 
suggested and a framework for testing them.  Included here are relevant discussions 
related to the specific methodologies to be used. Following this section, the design of 
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two separate experimental studies will be presented, as well as the statistical tests of 
these results and pertinent discussions. Prior to the concluding section, a case study is 
described which attempts to expand the previously discussed experimental findings to 
the context of real world events.  
The program suggested here attempts to deal with what is seen as a glaring 
absence in the study of foreign policy decision making, namely, the role of emotional 
factors.  The study of cognitions related to foreign policy questions has led many to 
conclude that what people think or believe is important.  That being said, I propose that 
what they feel is important as well.  While arguments might be raised that organizational 
and bureaucratic mechanisms hinder any influence of emotions on international 
relations, or that leaders and other ‘experts’ are less influenced by emotional factors and 
more interested in rational, cost-benefit calculations and interest maximization, or even 
that the diplomatic corps exists solely to offset the vagaries of the emotional experience 
in international relations, I find it difficult to throw out a fundamental component of the 
human existence (and unquestioned in other fields of social inquiry) in explaining 
critical decisions of war and peace.  My hope is that this study will contribute to an 
interest in the field of emotions as they impact international relations, and that in the 
course of this study and others to follow, new techniques will be developed to overcome 
the many obstacles faced by those interested in how emotions affect foreign policy 
decision-making. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
DEFINING EMOTION 
Recent advances in the study of emotion suggest that our current understanding 
of this intricate phenomenon only hints at the potential influences of emotion on 
cognitive and sociological behavior. A sample of these studies suggest linkages between 
emotion and memory (Blaney 1986), perception and attention (Zajonc 1980; Halberstadt 
and Niedenthal 1997; Ito et al. 1998; Niedenthal et al. 1997), attitudes (Cacioppo and 
Gardner 1999; Matsumoto 1993), decision-making (Damasio 1999; Forgas 1990, 1994, 
2000; Schwarz and Clore 1996; Bodenhausen 1993), interpersonal relationships 
(Gardner 1999; Collins 1996), and intergroup relationships (Fiske 1981; Bodenhausen 
1993) to name but a few. 
 Like sailors observing the surface of an iceberg while understanding that much 
more lies hidden under the water’s surface, so to do researchers of emotion grapple with 
the potential impact of their subject on vast areas of the human experience. By far the 
most troubling fact facing researchers of emotion is the difficulty in defining the 
phenomenon (Young 1973; Fantino 1973; Chaplin and Krawiec 1979). Regardless of 
this longstanding difficulty, some consistencies have been noted across the numerous 
attempts to define emotion.  
Lazarus and Lazarus (1994) note that most definitions of emotion are 
characterized by three components: some physiological change, an inclination towards 
some behavior or action, and a subjective, felt experience. Some studies, most notably 
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the work of Ekman (1992, 1994, 1999), emphasize the existence of basic emotions (e.g. 
fear, anger, sadness, disgust) that differ markedly from each other in terms of behavioral 
responses, physiology and other characteristics.  Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) 
analyzed 92 definitions of emotion and concluded that most were vague and lacking 
consistency. Attempting to synthesize the research they reviewed, the authors suggested 
a definition of emotion which emphasized “a complex set of interactions among 
subjective and objective factors, mediated by neural/hormonal systems which can (a) 
give rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal . . . (b) generate cognitive 
processes . . . (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments . . . (d) lead to behavior 
that is often, but not always, expressive, goal directed, and adaptive (ibid:355).  Beyond 
these summations, broader characterizations of emotion emphasize basic cognitive, 
biological, and behavioral components (Crawford 2000). Above all, definitions of 
emotion suggest a marked change from some behavioral, biological and 
phenomenological norm. An emotional state is deemed “abnormal” insofar as it departs 
from one’s normal physiological state of existence (Lyons 1999). Such physiological 
changes and accompanying states of subjective feeling are viewed as integral parts of the 
emotional experience (ibid; Lewis and Granic 1999).  
A wide range of emotional effects have been discussed in the psychological and 
sociological literature.  The evidence indicates that emotion reduces the analytical 
processing of information and increases the reliance on the use of heuristics cues and 
simplifying approaches (Hamilton et al. 1993; Mackie and Hamilton 1993). Strong 
emotions within the context of foreign affairs can affect the manner in which decision 
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makers evaluate and sort through information pertaining to important international 
events.  Vertzberger (1990:326-327) notes that “...knowledge that is embedded in 
traumatic historical events, that contains a strong affective element, and that becomes a 
source of central beliefs is immensely difficult to refute or falsify.  It encourages a 
continuing search for validating evidence [emphasis mine] and has stereotypic effects 
with regard to the expected behavior of other actors.”   
Emotional responses can provide information to decision makers as well as to 
those observing them. Emotions inform decision makers as to the conflictual or peaceful 
nature of a situation (Schwarz and Clore 1988, 1996).  On the other hand, an emotional 
response can be incorporated into a larger evaluation of another.  Lodge and Taber 
(2000) suggest that affective tags are added to overall appraisals of others and contribute 
to judgments in the same way that any other piece of information might be used. 
Hermann et al. (1982) propose that affect functions as an indication of personal and 
official attitudes towards other actors, and can provide indications of intent: direction of 
behavior (positive or negative) and intensity.  
Understanding the specific neurological and physiological processes associated 
with threat perception are now viewed as important components of emotion (Gray 1999). 
More recent advances in neuroscience have allowed researchers to study the specific 
brain centers associated with emotions such as anger, fear, and sadness (Rolls 1999; 
LeDoux 1996; Gray 1987, 1999; Damasio 1999).   Important advances along these lines 
have led current theories of emotion to emphasize a combination of cognitive and 
physiological processes in explaining and describing the structure and effect of emotion 
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on decision making. As a result, more recent theories of emotion have begun to suggest 
that similar physiological and phenomenological responses in the presence of an 
emotional stimulus that are consistent across individuals and cultures, resulting from 
biologically adaptive functions (Lewis and Granic 1999). The work of neuroscientists 
such as Damasio (1994, 1999), Bechara (Bechara et al. 1997) and others (c.f. Adolphs 
1999; Adolphs and Tranel 1999) have revolutionized how political scientists, 
psychologists, economists and sociologists have had to conceptualize emotion.  
Damasio’s seminal work on the neuro-biological foundation of human emotion 
and reason has focused on the relationship between cognitive representations of the 
environment and emotions. Namely, his work has shown that emotional responses to 
external (i.e. environmental) events are neurological and physiological patterns of nerve 
cell activation. More specifically, by examining the behavior of individuals with damage 
to the emotion-centers of the brain, Damasio and colleagues have shown that emotions 
are essential to rationality. The inability of such individuals to offer emotional responses 
to their environment inhibits their inability to act appropriately or perform certain 
judgment and planning tasks. Much of the recent work on emotion across disciplines, 
including this study, has been influenced by this cognitive neuro-physiological approach 
to emotion. 
 
Psychology 
Recent neurological discoveries in the study of emotion not withstanding, the 
bulk of the work in this area has been done by psychologists across all sub-disciplines. 
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Two general trends of research on emotions have developed within the field of 
psychology: those which approach emotion as a physiological/neurological 
phenomenon, and those which approach in as an attitudinal phenomenon. Simply put, 
among these studies the former tend to characterize emotion in terms of arousal, while 
the later tend to characterize it in terms of a valenced structure (e.g. like/dislike).  
Emotions as “Emotion” 
Within the field of psychology, the development of the study of emotions has 
generally followed two different lines of research.  The prominent psychologist William 
James was one of several pioneers arguing that emotions were primarily a physiological 
phenomenon (1884, 1890).  According to early theorists like James, emotions such as 
fear, anger, sadness and joy were correlated with specific physiological reactions 
(Leventhal 1980).  Early theories of emotion focused on autonomic feedback as 
constituting emotion—physiological responses told us what we were feeling (James 
1890; c.f. Fiske and Taylor 1991:415).  
Though further refinements within this line of research found flaws in much of 
these early studies, body reaction theories or central neural theories (Cannon 1927) 
repeatedly emphasized the link between subjective feeling states and autonomic 
physiological arousal. Cannon (1927, in Leventhal 1980:145) claimed that emotions 
resulted from central neural activity. Schachter (1964, 1971; Schachter and Singer 1962) 
proposed a variant of the central neural theory which suggested a two-component 
process of physiological arousal and cognitive interpretation, whereby which “Visceral 
activation provides the intensity and particular emotional feel of the experience, while 
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evaluative cognitions provide the quality of differentiated emotional experience” (Fiske 
and Taylor 1991:423). A common underlying assumption of these research program is 
that emotions exist as a system distinct from cognitions  (Moreland and Zajonc 1979; 
Leventhal 1980; Murphy et al 1995) and arising from independent processes (c.f. 
Marcus 2000) but mediated by cognitive activity (Fiske and Taylor 1991).   
The emphasis on diffuse emotional response resulting from physiological 
changes has led researchers to propose a number of effects on decision-making and 
information processing. For example, Bodenhausen (1993) finds that the physiological 
changes accompanying emotions such as anger and anxiety disrupt decision-making 
performance, resulting in heuristic-oriented information seeking strategies and a 
reduction of cognitive capacity. Such an approach is compatible in many areas with 
studies suggesting that emotion serves as a form of information to individuals, and that 
emotion in fact enhances the ability of individuals to extract information from stimuli 
(Schwarz and Clore 1988, 1996; Halberstadt and Niedenthal 1997). 
Emotions as “Affect” 
In contrast to the ‘separate systems’ (Zajonc 1980, 1984, 2000) approach to 
emotion, many social psychological studies of attitudes have tended to view emotions as 
one element within the attitudinal structure (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Russell 1980).  
Marcus (2000) notes that this approach has attempted to provide a cognitive explanation 
of emotion. This research has modeled attitudes as consisting of three interrelated 
components: affect, cognition, and behavioral inclinations (Fiske and Taylor 1991; 
Eagly and Chaiken 1998).  Beliefs that another is evil, good, kind, etc. fall within the 
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cognitive component of attitudes.  Feelings of like or dislike (a valenced structure) fall 
within the affective component, and inclinations toward hostility or cooperation within 
the behavioral component (Fiske and Taylor 1991).  Taken together, these distinct yet 
interrelated elements characterize the evaluative nature of attitudes. At their basis, 
definitions of attitudes have focused on their evaluative nature (Fiske and Taylor 1991; 
Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Eagly and Chaiken 1998; Pratkanis 1989).   
Within the attitude/valence line of research, attitudes and emotions are closely 
intertwined, as illustrated by Eagly and Chaiken’s observation that, “Attitudes express 
passions and hates, attractions and repulsions, likes and dislikes” (1998:269). Affect is 
related to preference/liking, and is thus related to approach and avoidance inclinations 
(Leary 2000: 332). Brewer and Kramer (1985) note that “The affective component is 
best represented in the shared feelings of acceptance-rejection, trust-distrust, and liking-
disliking that characterize attitudes toward specific groups in a social system.” Two 
important results of this approach to understanding emotion have been in how these 
theories view the both the nature and structure of emotion. 
As a component of attitudes, the emotion as affect approach suggests that 
emotional responses are generated from cognitive appraisals (Weiner 1985; Roseman et 
al. 1994; Lazarus and Lazarus 1994; Ottati and Wyer 1990; Parkinson and Manstead 
1992), and that two-dimensions, valence and intensity, best account for the structure of 
emotion (Plutchik and Conte 1997; Larsen and Diener 1992; Russell 1980; Remington et 
al. 2000). 
 21 
 It is clear that the two approaches to understanding emotion rely on vastly 
differing assumptions about the nature and structure of human emotional response. 
While neither approach is mutually exclusive, and in many cases compatible, the 
important effect insofar as this research program is concerned lies in the effect that these 
two discrepant approaches have had on the study of emotions within the political arena. 
 
Political Science 
A consideration of emotion as a variable within the realm of politics is by no 
means a new idea. Marcus (2000) notes that most of the classical political thinkers, 
including Aristotle, Plato, Hobbes, Descartes, Hume and Smith found it important to 
address the role of emotion in understanding human nature and politics. As Crawford 
(2000) notes, Thucydides clearly defines the role that fear played in the war between 
Athens and Sparta.  A similar emphasis on fear and threat can be found within much of 
the realist literature on foreign policy, arms races and deterrence (Morgenthau 1967; 
Waltz 1967; Wallace and Suedfeld 1988; Intrilligator 1982; Intrilligator and Brito 1989; 
Richardson 1960).  
Much of the uncertainty characterizing political science’s approach to emotion 
has been mirrored by the confusion found in psychological research. In the same way 
that psychologists have drawn parallels between emotions and beliefs or attitudes, so to 
have political scientists looked at emotions in light of political attitudes and beliefs.  As 
some psychologists have argued for a physiological emphasis on emotional response, 
Marcus and his colleagues have also begun to stress the importance of physiology in 
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threat assessment and candidate evaluation (1988, 2000; Marcus and Mackuen 1993; 
Marcus et al. 1998; Mackuen et al. 2000). The theoretical distance and confusion 
between studies which have emphasized emotion as an attitudinal component, and those 
which have stressed emotion as physiological and neurobiological function only mirrors 
the long-existing confusion in the psychological study of emotion. Generally speaking, 
these two related and interdisciplinary schools address affect (attitude/valence) in the 
first case and emotion (physiology/arousal) in the latter case. In order to develop a model 
which explains how emotions impact foreign policy decision making processes and 
choices, both approaches emotion must be taken into consideration. 
Emotions have been indirectly addressed in the foreign policy decision-making 
literature.  One could suggest that the first studies of emotion were those dealing with 
the effects of stress on decision-making and studies of attitudes or beliefs. Since the 
1960s a great deal of attention has focused on the effects of stress in political decision 
making and crisis (Holsti 1972, 1979; Hermann 1972; Lamb 1989; Mor 1993; Roberts 
1988).  The majority of these studies defined stress in such a way as to emphasize the 
relationship between time pressures, goal commitments, and decisional performance, 
rather than emphasize any emotional component of the crisis situation. It can be argued, 
however, that these studies implied an emotional component of international decision 
making behavior. Janis and Mann’s (1977) discussion of ‘hot cognitions’ (c.f. Herek et 
al. 1987; Abelson 1963) acknowledged that emotional arousal associated with critical 
and stressful decisions compelled decision-makers to undertake sub-optimal problem 
solving measures. Herrmann (1984, 1988) argues that perceived threats and 
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opportunities correspond to the affective notions of like and dislike, exerting pressure on 
subjects to act and define a situation in a certain way.  Increases in the degree of felt 
threat and opportunity correspond with the use of simpler images (more enemy or ally).  
Imagery “The more intense the affect becomes, the more stereotypical the cognitive 
schema will be, and, in turn, the more predictable the policy choice” (Herrmann et al. 
1997:555). In times of stress, cognitive performance can be dramatically affected by 
emotional states, and result in diminished cognitive complexity, a decrease in the 
individual’s tolerance for ambiguity and ability to evaluate information, and hamper the 
evaluation of alternatives (Vertzberger 1990; Hermann 1972; Holsti 1972). 
Emotions or feelings have also been either directly or indirectly addressed in the 
research focusing on political attitudes and beliefs.  These include studies of belief 
systems and operational codes (George 1969; Holsti 1962, 1967, 1976; Walker 1977; 
1983) and images (Herrmann 1988; Herrmann et al. 1997; Cottam 1986, 1994; Hudson 
1995).  Rather than suggesting a direct effect of emotions on foreign policy behavior, 
these models imply that actor-oriented beliefs and attitudes include affective evaluations 
of and orientations toward other nations or leaders. Thus, Dixon (1983), Hermann et al. 
(1982) and Hudson et al. (1989) conceptualize affect as a reflection of governmental 
attitudes toward another object.  
The role of emotions has also been a subject of some focus within the broader 
study of political science. The affective elements of political attitudes (Brady and 
Sniderman 1985; Sniderman et al. 1991), emotional responses to political issues 
(Conover and Feldman 1986; Kinder and Sanders 1990, 1996), and the emotional 
 24 
character of national patriotism have received attention in the literature (Rahn et al. 
1996).  Gibson (1992), Gibson and Bingham (1982) and Marcus et al. (1998) have also 
addressed political intolerance as a form of emotional reaction. Lodge (1995; Lodge et 
al. 1989; Lodge and Taber 2000) notes that the affective tag is an inherent feature of 
political candidate evaluation and biases voters’ judgments toward or away from that 
candidate.   
Departing from the focus on attitudes and emotions, the research of Marcus and 
colleagues (Marcus 1988; Marcus et al. 1998; Marcus and MacKuen 1993) has 
emphasized the physiology of emotion and has stressed the need to understand the 
interplay of emotion and politics in light of neural and biological research.  Marcus and 
colleagues suggest a dual-channel model of emotion characterized by two emotionality 
systems: a threat-attendant system and an enthusiasm generating system.  The threat 
attendant system monitors the environment and creates feelings ranging from safety to 
anxiety.  The mood state system monitors current behavior and successes to generate 
feelings ranging from depression to enthusiasm. According to this model, negative 
events increase attention and emotional reactions are crucial in the stimulation of 
attention (Marcus and Mackuen 1993: 673). 
 
EMOTIONS: EVENT INTERPRETATION AND INFORMATION 
PROCESSING 
As noted earlier, the focus of this study will be on the development of a model of 
decision making which incorporates emotions. Just a brief review of the literature in 
 25 
question would suggest any number of areas upon which emotions might have an 
important impact. The study of foreign policy decision making has attempted to focus on 
those variables which influence the formulation of foreign policies by attempting to 
describe and explain how decision makers make sense of and respond to a constant 
stream of complex information about international events.  Taken as the unit of analysis, 
the decision maker is viewed as the “system” which transforms inputs through varying 
processes into policy outputs (Snyder et al. 2002). How inputs become policy choices 
has been a focal point for much of the decision making literature, with competing 
schools of thought emphasizing cognitive processes, cybernetic or rational behavior, or 
organizational and bureaucratic structures of process and/or outputs.   
 It should be self evident that the emotional nature of hotly disputed foreign 
policies would be a prime area in which we might find evidence of the influence of 
emotion. As De Rivera (1984: 122) notes,  
With all of his various interests clamoring for recognition and a number 
of important emotional relationships demanding attention, the person 
does not make a choice as much as he supervises some very active 
processes.  In order to act, he must take the reality of the situation that 
confronts him and give it meaning that both fits the objective structure of 
the situation and meets his interests and emotions. 
 
De Rivera’s statement provides an important and significant point of emphasis for a 
development of such a theory. How do individuals give meaning to, or make sense of, 
the various pieces of information relating to foreign policy? As will be discussed in more 
detail in the following section, it seems prudent to adopt a model which incorporates the 
notion of some interaction of cognition and emotion on such processes. As Zajonc et al. 
have suggested, “The interaction of affect and cognition is the interaction of the 
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associative network of the particular affect and the associative network of the particular 
cognition” (1982: 217).  Their comment echoes further developments already noted in 
the field of emotion which emphasize a dual relationship between cognition and feeling 
states. Such an approach to emotion as an independent variable on decision processes 
leads the researcher to view it as an important internal variable which helps individuals 
makes sense of reality. In sum, emotion is not only information which is used as 
“heuristically relevant information” (Schwarz and Clore 1988:48), but it should be 
treated as a separate process. Zajonc clearly notes such an approach by stating that, 
“Emotions are not representations of reality, but they are reality” (Zajonc 2000: 47). 
 In sum, if we take to heart Tetlock’s (1983) opinion that ““The fundamental 
diagnostic dilemma of international relations is one of motivational attribution: 
determining the intentions (likely future conduct) of particular other states” it would 
seem wise to develop an approach to decision-making which goes beyond the current 
approach within the foreign policy literature of acknowledging an emotional effect of 
stress and/or threat while attempting no serious empirical development of how emotions 
influence the interpretation of foreign policy events and processing of foreign policy 
information. 
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MODEL∗ 
 
If emotions are conceptualized as a system which interacts with the cognitive 
system, then foreign policy behavior can be framed as an interplay between stimuli, 
cognitive, and emotional systems.  While emotions in previous research have often been 
associated with arousal, they are also associated with cognition. Emotions participate in 
the experience of social phenomena as expressions of a cognitive and physiological 
interaction.  
The definition of emotions proposed here takes into account the total interplay of 
these factors: Emotions are responses to external stimuli which are perceived to impact 
an individual’s well-being (as defined by the self or primary group).  These responses 
are characterized by phenomenological, physiological, and behavioral properties and in 
turn are associated either directly or indirectly with structures within the cognitive 
system. The aggregate properties (phenomenological, physiological, behavioral 
impulses) of emotions become labeled experiences (anger, joy, hate, fear) connected 
directly to event-specific objects (e.g. other individuals, groups, states, organizations, or 
institutions).  They are indirectly connected to these objects via a post-hoc 
cognitive/evaluative tag called ‘affect.’ 
 
                                                 
∗
 Geva, Nehemia, James Mayhar and J. Mark Skorick, “The Cognitive Calculus of Foreign Policy 
Decision Making: An Experimental Assessment” Journal of Conflict Resolution (Vol. 44, No. 4) pp.447-
455, copyright 2000 by Sage Publications Inc., Reprinted by Permission of Sage Publications Inc. 
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THE LONG TERM EXPERIENTIAL SYSTEM (LoTES) 
The hypotheses to be tested in this research program are derived a model which 
explains how cognitions and emotions interact to influence information processing. The 
Long Term Experiential System (LoTES) model represents the two independent yet 
interactive systems of experience used by individuals to make sense of the world. It is a 
“long-term” system because it comprises emotions and cognitions about the world which 
are not ephemeral or transient in nature, but stable over time and thus accessible when 
events in the external environment demand interpretation. It is an “experiential” model 
because it consists of an important bank of “experiences” which help individuals make 
sense of their world. The use of this term is intended as a double-entendre, both in 
reference to the existential experiences of one’s history and knowledge (i.e. cognitive) 
and in reference to those internal physiological “experiences” (associated with ANS 
responses) which we label emotions. Finally, it is a system because it consists of two 
inter-related systems—the cognitive and emotional—which provide the conscious and 
“unconscious”  backdrop into which information about the world arrives, is sorted, 
interpreted, and used to make decisions. Before elaborating on the LoTES model, a few 
words about the underlying assumptions of the model should be more clearly specified at 
this point.  
First, emotions are an inter-related system of feeling states which exist 
independently of cognition. However, the emotional system (ES) is highly connected to 
cognitive and physiological structures. This is what might be referred to as the 
“existential assumption”: emotions are experiences which we consider to be emotions 
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once they are labeled as such. However, as emotions, they exist prior to the cognitive 
activity of labeling them. Thus emotions are not wholly reliant on cognition (though 
there is evidence suggesting that they are reliant upon neurological antecedents, c.f. 
Damasio 1994, 1999; Damasio et al. 1990; Bechara et al. 1997). The assumption that 
emotions, as experiences, exist independently of cognitions is compatible with much of 
the current research on emotion (Zajonc 1980; Zajonc et al. 1982; Marcus and MacKuen 
1993). 
Second, as Ekman (1992, 1994, 1999) notes, there exist a number of basic and 
distinct emotions which differ from each other in terms of their appraisal, antecedent 
events, behavioral and physiological responses, as well as other characteristics. These 
basic emotions can be considered to comprise “clustered feeling states” within an 
individual’s LoTES. 
Third, this study concurs with the work of Marcus and colleagues that one of the 
key functions of the emotional system, particularly as it relates to foreign policy, 
concerns threat identification (Marcus 1988; Marcus and MacKuen 1993). This approach 
is further compatible with a number of findings which stress the importance of emotion 
as a monitoring mechanism (Zajonc et al. 1982).  
Fourth, “felt” emotions are reflections of the activation of an emotional system 
and as such serve as valuable information to decision makers and individuals. This 
assumption is congruent with the work of Schwarz and Clore (1988) which suggests that 
individuals use feelings as “heuristically relevant information” (ibid:48).  
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Fifth, a strong tendency exists for individuals to maintain harmony between 
cognitive and emotional systems (Heider 1958; Herrmann 1988; Murray and Cowden 
1999).  
Sixth, and lastly, emotion and affect are two separate yet related ingredients of 
the decision making recipe.  As will be noted below, and as has been alluded to in the 
previous section, the evaluative component of cognitions relating to some stimuli is 
considered to be that which much of previous social psychological and political science 
research has termed “affect.”  As a result, it is consistent within this assumption to hold 
that an affective (or evaluative) component of a schema or image could be construed as a 
valenced tag, such as found in the research of several others (Dixon 1983; Lodge 1995). 
Figure 1. Cognitive and Emotional Systems 
 
External Stimuli 
Cognitive 
System 
Emotional 
System 
LoTES 
 
Executive 
Processor 
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The LoTES of individuals is comprised of two systems of representing environmental 
stimuli: The Emotional System (ES) and the Cognitive System (CS).  As Figure 1 
shows, external stimuli can impact both the emotional and cognitive content of problems 
undertaken by a decision maker.   
Conversely, the LoTES can also influence the character and quality of the 
problems addressed by a decision maker.  While the contents of the executive processor 
are cognitive (who/what the problem is) and emotional (how I feel about it), the type of 
contents and capacity for such may be further influenced by emotions. 
Figure 1 consists of three important components which will be discussed in 
further detail: 1) external stimuli such as changes in the international environment or 
event-generated signals indicating some potential change, 2) the Long Term Experiential 
System, or LoTES, which represents both the content and interaction of emotions and 
cognitions, and 3) the executive processor which represents the decision maker’s current 
cognitive and emotional content as well as the capacity for such.  
Frijda (1988) notes that emotions are most often elicited by certain types of 
events. An event-oriented approach to foreign policy analysis was first suggested by 
Hermann (1969b).  More recent studies focusing on the properties of the foreign policy 
situation, and the placement of important variables within the situation or event, suggest 
that the perception of events influence decision processes and outcomes.  Hudson et al. 
(1989:117) note that “As the [decision maker] sorts out who is doing what to whom and 
where it stands in relation to the other players . . . a predisposition for a certain type of 
foreign policy behavior . . . will arise from the requirements of the situational context.” 
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Studies focusing on the effects of crisis on decision making emphasize the perception of 
certain actions as factors leading to predictable processes and outcomes (cites). 
The model therefore begins with the idea that decisions often result from some 
external stimulus.  The stimulus (or event) exists within the context of a situation 
(Hermann 1969b).  The most salient situation to students of foreign policy decision 
makers is that which might lead to a decision for war or peace.  As a class of 
phenomena, these situations or events, can be measured by a number of variables: the 
qualities of the main actors, the types of actions taken, the intensity of actions taken, the 
potential for important goals to be achieved or thwarted, the quality of present and past 
relationships among actors, the number and quality of possible responses to the event 
(assuming that an infinite number of responses is unlikely and improbable), the amount 
of time available to respond, the distribution of relative power among actors, etc.  
International events can thus be characterized by a number of characteristics. 
The principal components of the LoTES model are 1) a cognitive system, 2) an 
emotional system, and 3) an executive processor analogous to the working memory 
concept of social and individual psychology. 
 
Cognitive System 
Within the Cognitive System (CS) we find clusters of information such as 
schemata, images, beliefs and attitudes. Schema or images of other actors in the 
international system allow decision makers to ascertain the values, interests, motivations, 
strength and weakness, and friendliness or hostility of other nations (Fiske and Taylor 
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1991; Herrmann 1988; Herrmann et al. 1997).  Perceived actor qualities such as cultural 
similarity and relative power capabilities incline decision makers towards certain 
inferences about the intentions of other actors, which in turn predisposes them towards 
certain policies.   
The study of images in international relations has suggested that decision makers 
use clusters of knowledge, or images, to represent, to categorize, make inferences, and 
draw conclusions about a nation and its leaders (Cottam 1994; Herrmann et al. 1997; 
Herrmann 1988; Jervis 1976; Rosati 1998). The “enemy” image or schema has received 
considerable attention in the literature (White 1966, 1968; Holsti 1967; Cottam 1977; 
Cottam 1994; Herrmann 1988; Herrmann et al. 1997; Rothbart and Hallmark 1988; 
Sande et al. 1989).  For example, a decision maker who perceives another nation to be an 
enemy may conclude, even prior to any triggering action, that they have evil intentions, 
imperial or hegemonic interests, hide domestic weaknesses through international 
posturing, and a leadership capable of executing complex, sinister plots (Herrmann 
1988; Herrmann et al. 1997). 
Affective tags are attached to many of these cognitive structures. In line with the 
previously discussed literature on attitudes, affective tags are the evaluative attachments 
to cognitions about other objects such as “I like,” or “I dislike.” Lodge (1995) notes that 
the cognitions of individuals about political candidates are imbued with an affective or 
emotional value.  Similarly, the cognitions of individuals about other nations carry an 
emotional element.  In an early work, Boulding (1959) noted that emotions were an 
integral component of decision makers’ images of other nations.  He defined an image as 
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“the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal 
view of itself and its universe” [emphasis mine].   
The LoTES model suggests that affect is thus part of the CS and is tied to the 
cognitive representation of the object in question.  The accumulation of experiences with 
another nation can therefore lead to the development of a general affective or evaluative 
tendency. Hudson, Hermann and Singer (1989:121) define this tendency as an “affective 
prior history” which represents the “accumulated manifestations of affect in previous 
interactions that the actor has expressed toward a relevant other, and has received from 
it.” As Vertzberger further notes, “A state’s previous unfortunate experience with a type 
of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger” (1990:470). 
 
Emotional System  
The ES consists of clustered and inter-connected structures of discrete or basic 
emotions which are binary in nature (either ‘on’ or ‘off’), hard-wired to rapid changes in 
physiological state, and marked by behavioral impulses or routines (“fight or flight”), 
and an experiential state of being, or “feeling.”  In keeping with the work of Marcus and 
his colleagues, the emotional system is particularly sensitive along the lines of two 
dimensions: threat/safety or success/failure.1 
The ES and CS work in tandem (Zajonc et al. 1982; Matthews and Wells 1999). 
The ES is activated by situational cues and connected to schematic (i.e. cognitive) 
structures. The emotional system is actively sensitive to stimuli which might require 
activation of “flight/fight” routines (e.g. threats to bodily harm).  Such stimuli can be 
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activated by external cues or by reference to schema or images associated with 
experienced episodes of similar emotions. Emotions not only provide critical 
identification signals to the perceiver (Schwarz and Clore 1988) about the state in which 
they find themselves, but the information which individuals glean from the environment 
in turn influences the quality and character of the emotional response.   
The ES is highly sensitive to negative affect and particularly threat cues from 
such objects (Marcus et al 1998).  Once such cues are encountered, affective tags 
attached to schematic objects (such as enemies), and linked to structures within the ES, 
trigger appropriate cognitive and emotional procedures and supply necessary content 
(cognitive and emotional) for further action. This includes drawing into the Executive 
Processor schematically and emotionally congruent information culled from the 
cognitive system or more actively from the environment. 
 
Executive Processor 
This structure is generally conceptualized as a system for actively storing and 
processing information relevant to complex tasks such as problem solving and decision 
making (Baddeley 1986; Cantor and Engle 1993; Just and Carpenter 1992; Shallice 
1982).  The executive processor has been construed as a limited capacity system for 
dealing not only with decision making tasks, but also, with difficult, novel or dangerous 
situations, or those in which habitual responses might be enacted (Shallice 1982).  The 
critical characteristics of the executive processor are its capacity and its contents. Thus, 
as the “holding tank” and working area for current decision making information and 
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tasks, the items within the executive processor hold particular relevance for decision 
makers.  
 
LoTES: HOW THE MODEL WORKS 
The LoTES model allows us to understand how emotions impact foreign policy 
behavior by reflecting findings which suggest that negative or threatening emotional 
stimuli receive more attention (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Derryberry 1991; Pratto and 
John 1991), provide critical information to perceivers (Schwarz and Clore 1988) and 
result in sub-optimal and heuristic-driven information processing strategies (Janis and 
Mann 1977; Bodenhausen 1993).  Emotional units associated with an event are labeled 
and linked to previous information relevant to the event via the cognitive system (e.g. 
affective tags); Cognitions associated with an event are ‘colored’ or experienced with aid 
from the emotional system, which fires appropriate emotions based on links to 
characteristics of the event.  Both systems are cross-supportive and can be ‘fired’ by 
input from the other. Given the assumption that both emotions and cognitions also arise 
out of external stimuli or events (Frijda 1988), we have a triangular relationship. 
When individuals are faced with a political problem that generates an emotional 
response, the LoTES model proposes that negative emotions constrain the (1) content 
and (2) capacity of process items placed in the executive processor in dealing with that 
problem. Emotions have a “thematic” effect on the types of items drawn into the 
executive processor in the process of interpreting events.  Few—and emotionally 
congruent—items are drawn from the cognitive system into the executive processor. 
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The presence of few and relatively homogeneous clusters of information being 
used results in biased interpretive processes which are generally consistent with 
appropriate schema or images (e.g. the use of stereotypes).  Similarly, the use of few and 
simplified pieces of information influences the processing of information.  Since 
individuals tend to process information in an on-line manner (Geva and Skorick 1999; 
Geva et al. 2000; Lodge 1995; Lodge and Taber 2000; Lodge et al. 1989), these effects 
of emotions result in fewer items of information accessed, less time spent reviewing 
information, greater attention to affectively consistent items of information, and higher 
recall of such items. 
If emotions have a “thematic” effect on the types of information used to make a 
decision, the same is not held to be true for negative affective states. The affective state 
of individuals is purely dependent upon negative cognitions surrounding a decision 
making task. Negative affect results from negative cognitions about another actor or 
situation. As noted above, cognitions about foreign policy actors and actions can carry 
what have been referred to in the literature as “affective tags” (Lodge 1995; Lodge et al. 
1999; Taber 1992, 1995). Such tags are often modeled as “like” or “dislike” evaluations 
associated with cognitive images, but they are not emotions. 
As negative information about an actor (external stimuli) is perceived and placed 
in the Executive Processor, it is evaluated and incorporated into the CS (images are 
updated or confirmed, for example). Recall that the part of the job of the ES is to 
evaluate the current level of threat in the environment (Marcus 1988, 2000; Marcus and 
Mackuen 1993; Marcus et al. 1998). At the same time, the ES has already taken note of 
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the information in that it is “aware” of its existence in the CS. As more and more 
negative information arrives into the Executive Processor, the CS is able to adequately 
update cognitions surrounding the situation and make sense of the environment. 
Assuming a constant stream of negative information, it is theoretically plausible 
for the ES to go on high-alert and begin the thematic restriction on information drawn 
into the Executive Processor. Thus the relationship between affect and emotion is 
continuous; however the effect of the thematic restriction resulting from an emotional 
response has a non-linear effect on the types and quantity of information used thereafter. 
Regardless of whether the shift from negative affective evaluation occurs gradually over 
time or results spontaneously from a sudden shock, once threats are perceived, the 
LoTES suggests that the Executive Processor immediately constricts the amount and 
types of information used to make sense of the environment. The decline in the amount 
of information sought as well as the increase in the schematic consistency of information 
used represents a dramatic shift. Under conditions of threat, simple schemas are relied 
upon and stereotypes become useful. The key is that the cognitive tasks of updating and 
evaluating information from the environment are drastically modified by the demand 
from the emotional system to deal with a novel, threatening situation. 
Before specifying propositions which can be derived from this model, it is 
necessary to frame it within the bounds of another model designed to explain process 
outcome and choice in international relations. The Cognitive Calculus (CC) theory 
(Geva et al. 2000; Geva and Skorick 1999) attempts to model the cognitive processes 
used by decision makers in dealing with foreign policy problems.2 This Cognitive 
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Calculus theory is introduced here to suggest a way of conceptualizing how the CS in the 
LoTES model operates under normal circumstances. As has been discussed above, the 
LoTES model suggests that both the CS and ES are constantly dealing with information 
from the environment in a sequential and on-line manner. The CS is constantly updating 
through use of information from the environment while the ES is monitoring this same 
information for evidence of threat. Looking more closely at the inner workings of the 
CS, as suggested by the Cognitive Calculus model, provides a clearer picture of how an 
emotional state can constrict the interpretation of foreign policy events as well as 
influence choice. 
 
The Cognitive Calculus Model of Foreign Policy Decision Making 
 
Geva and colleagues (Geva et al. 2000; Geva and Skorick 1999; Skorick 2002) 
suggest that an on-line process model best represents the manner in which foreign policy 
decisions are conducted.  Milton Lodge introduced such a model of political candidate 
evaluation (Lodge 1995; Lodge et al. 1989). The online model holds that information 
integration is a sequential process. Upon exposure to incoming information, individuals 
form their evaluation of decision options by immediately integrating the valence of the 
raw material into a ‘running evaluation tally’ (ibid).  In Anderson’s words (1981:144), 
"Information is received a piece at a time and integrated into a continuously evolving 
impression." 
 The Cognitive Calculus (CC) model suggests that foreign policy decision-makers 
integrate information into a cumulative choice propensity counter (CCP) which 
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represents a decision maker’s inclination to adopt one option or the other.  The CC 
model also consists of an important aspect not addressed by Lodge’s on-line model: a 
threshold (TH) representing the point where the decision process stops.  The evaluation 
of information continues until the choice propensity passes this threshold, or until 
decision makers run out of information. 
 To simplify the problem, the decision choice is modeled as composed of two 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives, specifically, the choice between 
executing a specific policy (A) and not executing it (~A).3 These two options may consist 
of using force or not using force in a bilateral international conflict, providing or not 
providing economic foreign aid to another country, and more.  
Geva and colleagues assume that the process begins with a decision-maker 
pondering whether (for example) to use force or refrain from using force in a crisis. The 
decision-maker is then exposed to a sequential flow of information that he or she must 
consider before making a choice.4  The sources of these items may include advisors, 
media, representatives of other nations, and items retrieved from the decision-maker's 
own knowledge. 
According to the CC model, foreign policy inputs are defined by certain 
characteristics. They are the valence, relevancy, reliability and redundancy of the 
information. These factors influence the cognitive/computational process of decision 
making and affect whether information is included in and contributes to a foreign policy 
choice.  
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The  information valence (IV) of an item is defined as the implication an item has 
for moving choice propensity toward one of the two options.  The valence is negative 
‘one’ for information that will move the decision maker toward option ~A (not using 
force), 'zero' if it does not lead to a move toward either of the options, and positive 'one' 
for information that will move the decision maker toward option A (use of force).  Thus, 
the values of this parameter are: IV = -1, 0, 1 
The relevance of an item (Rl) reflects the ‘correlation’ between the dimension 
underlying the item, and the dimension underlying the decision maker’s choice 
propensity.5  The range of values of an item's relevancy is:   0< Rl<1  
Reliability (Rb) reflects the confidence a decision-maker has in the accuracy of 
the information.6 Information of low reliability has less of an impact on a decision than 
highly reliable information (controlling for its relevance).  The range of values of an 
item’s reliability is: 0 <Rb< 1 
As a decision maker acquires and processes information en route to a choice, he 
or she soon finds that cues are not only related to the crisis context, but that are also 
related to each other (c.f. Einhorn et al. 1979).  Redundancy, can be defined as the 
common variance between or among cues (Schmitt and Dudycha 1975), or simply as 
information intercorrelation (Gilliland and Schmitt 1993).  Information redundancy can 
have both positive as well as negative aspects for the decision process. 
Foreign policy decision-makers translate incoming information into the above 
mentioned parameters of valence, relevancy, reliability, and redundancy through their 
implicit theory of international relations (ITIR). The ITIR represents the stored 
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knowledge and beliefs any decision-maker holds with respect to international events. 
Taber notes that "any decision maker's belief system will contain beliefs about 'how the 
world works' in certain contexts" (Taber 1992:890). This knowledge base includes 
perceived and or believed relations that exist between or among concepts that describe 
the international arena. The ITIR, for example, may include the belief that a democracy 
will not wage war on another democracy, or that a bold aggressive foreign policy act 
facilitates domestic political credit, etc. The ITIR concept relates closely to similar 
conceptualizations of international belief systems (ibid), operational codes (George 
1969; Walker 1977, 1983), images (Herrmann et al. 1997), and cognitive maps (Axelrod 
1976; Young 1996). Taken together, the ITIR represents an individual’s cognitive 
system (CS) as theorized herein.   
The CC model suggests that during the decision process, there is constant 
interaction between incoming information and the ITIR.  This follows the Snyder, Bruck 
and Sapin’s (1962, 2002) proposition that the beliefs of national decision-makers affect 
the perceptions and interpretations of an international situation and are then translated to 
national actions.7  Basically, the ITIR is a critical source for defining the relevance of 
incoming information, as well as its relation to other items included in the process.  The 
valence of an item emanates from the ITIR as it suggests implications for accomplishing 
a decision-maker's goals.  Moreover, beliefs about the source of the information and the 
compatibility of its valence with previously acquired knowledge may translate into a 
decision-maker's confidence in an item's reliability.  An important process question 
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concerns what happens when the translation of information via the ITIR is usurped by 
the inclusion of emotion?   
 
PROPOSITIONS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS, AND HYPOTHESES 
The LoTES Model suggests several extremely important propositions for the 
relationship between negative emotions, negative affect, and cognitions about foreign 
policy events.   It is important to note that these hypotheses focus on the constraints that 
negative emotions place on the executive processor in terms of capacity and content, and 
that these constraints result in a step-wise effect on the amount and types of information 
pieces drawn into the executive processor. The propositions stated above are 
summarized again here: 
Proposition 1: Negative emotions limit both the capacity and content of items 
placed into the “executive processor.”  The model suggests that emotions have a 
“thematic” effect on the types of items drawn into working memory in the process of 
interpreting events.   
Proposition 2: The constraints on both capacity and content imposed by negative 
emotions on the executive processor are reflected in what is analogous to a ‘step-wise’ 
or non-linear movement between the number and quality of cognitions marked by no 
emotions and negative affect to negative emotions.  This relationship is made more 
implicit in the hypotheses suggested below. 
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Proposition 3: The association of negative emotions towards a target results in 
few—and primarily relevant and emotionally congruent—items drawn from the 
cognitive system into the executive processor.  
Proposition 4: The presence of few and relatively homogeneous clusters of 
information being used results in biased interpretive processes which are generally 
consistent with appropriate schema or images (e.g. the use of stereotypes).   
From the previous explication of the model and the discussion of the interaction 
of its related components, the hypothesis to be addressed here deal with the effects of the 
independent variable—a negative emotional and negative affect state on the part of the 
individual—on two different dependent variables: 1) event interpretation or how such 
persons make sense of the world, and 2) choice, or how such individuals make decisions 
about how foreign events should be dealt with.  
To reiterate the previous discussion, the LoTES model suggests that because of 
the restriction on cognitive capacity and content arising from a negative emotional state, 
individuals in such a state will use less information en route to interpreting or “making 
sense” of an important event and also use more negative inferences and attributions 
about an actor associated with that event. Similarly, this restriction on cognitive capacity 
and content resulting from the negative emotional state will influence individuals’ 
choices about how foreign policy events ought to be dealt with by restricting the amount 
of information available for use in such decisions and the amount of time spent attending 
to this information. 
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Dependent Variable 1: Event Interpretation 
As a critical variable in understanding foreign policy, making sense of the world 
has been shown in studies of problem representation and situational definition to play a 
key role in foreign policy outcomes (Hermann 1969b; Billings and Hermann 1998), the 
definition of the situation (Hermann 1969b). Within the foreign political context it is 
often the case the problems tend to be ill-defined requiring observers to add meaning to 
fill the vacancies left by poor or inadequate information (Vertzberger 1990). In such 
instances, a number of attributes are left unspecified or unclear and it their specification 
is dependent upon external or internal forces, such as the use of historical analogies, 
schematic reasoning, or further information searches (ibid.; Reitman 1964). How do 
observers “fill in the gaps” in order to make sense of what is taking place and thereby 
generate implications for oneself and one’s society? This is the fundamental question 
addressed by our attention to the dependent variable of event interpretation. 
While it may be that interpretation of an event is fundamentally cognitive, the 
LoTES model suggests that emotions impact cognitions relevant to stimuli. An event can 
be interpreted in a number of ways.  One way in which event interpretation can be 
understood is by analyzing the attributions, evaluations and inferences individuals make 
about an object.  Subjects who hate or are distressed by the actions of another country 
will make inferences about that actor’s motives, intentions, and qualities in a far 
different manner than one who does not feel any particular emotion toward that person.  
The presence of a negative emotion towards a target dramatically influences the 
types of cognitions brought to bear about the object.  As noted in Proposition 2, at a 
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certain point, a dramatic ‘step’ exists between a negative affective evaluation and the 
existence or occurrence of negative emotion.  This step accounts for the coloring of 
events which is activated by negative emotions like hate, anger or fear.  Similarly, the 
step from dislike to hate implies the differentiation in processing at the level of the 
emotional system versus that of the cognitive system. 
H1: A negative and non-linear main effect exists between the 
quantity and extremity of inferences and attributions made concerning an 
event and an individual’s emotional state (i.e. negative emotion, negative 
affect, or no emotion).   
Individuals experiencing negative emotions toward a target make 
more negative inferences and attributions about the characteristics of that 
actor, or the consequences of its actions, than do individuals experiencing 
negative affect—or no emotion or affect—toward an actor. 
 
 
Dependent Variable 2: Choice 
Relatedly, emotional cues are hypothesized to dramatically affect the processing 
of information about a foreign policy problem en route to a decision.  Hypothesis 1 is in 
agreement with Marcus’ model that individuals are more attentive to emotionally-laden 
information from the environment (1988).  However, parting from Marcus, the theory 
suggests that the heuristic value of negative emotions is such that less time, attention, 
and information will be utilized for a decision.   
Using the parameters of the CC theory, we might model the processing effects of 
emotions in terms of its effects on relevance, reliability, valence, and the TH.  The 
presence of negative emotions within the decision making context will attune decision 
makers to highly relevant and negatively valenced items of information.  Because of the 
information-providing function of emotions, reliability will be less important, as will 
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redundancy.  Finally, the constriction of the cognitive capacity by emotions suggests a 
narrower and asymmetrical TH.  The direct effect of emotions on information processing 
is to decrease the amount of information required to surpass the TH. 
H2a: A negative and non-linear main effect exists between the 
amount of information required to make a decision and an individual’s 
emotional state (i.e. negative emotion, negative affect, or no emotion).   
H2b: A negative and non-linear main effect exists between the 
amount of time required to make a decision and an individual’s emotional 
state. 
H2c: Hypotheses 2a and 2b are qualified by an interaction 
between the proportion of valenced items and an individual’s emotional 
state. The difference between the numbers of positive vs. negative items 
processed by individuals who have negative affect will be larger than that 
processed by individuals who have negative emotion or no emotion.  
Similarly, the difference between the amounts of time spent processing 
positive vs. negative items by individuals who have negative affect will 
be larger than that processed by individuals who have negative emotion 
or no emotion. 
 
 
OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF NEGATIVE AFFECT AND NEGATIVE 
EMOTION 
The critical independent variable in this study is the psychological state of the 
decision maker. There are three specific psychological states marking the three levels of 
the independent variable – psychological states that specify how the individual receptors 
interact with incoming information and thus influence the interpretation of the 
international event and the choices that person will make. The three levels of the 
independent variable are: emotion, affect, and control. Each level represents the extent to 
which the emotive system is involved in the information processing.  The onset of the 
emotive system requires the activation of the ANS as well as a personal subjective 
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experience that is labeled as an emotion. The affective state implies an evaluative 
response that is predominantly cognitive and the control state lacks either one of these 
experiences.   How are these states introduced and how confident are we that they are 
actually in operation? 
 
Inductions of the Negative Emotion 
Since a critical component in this state is the activation of the ANS ample 
research suggests that visual stimuli can incite ANS activities which are labeled as 
emotions by subjects (Ekman 1992, 1994; Gross and Levenson 1995). In order to 
generate the required independent variable states this study will pursue a similar 
strategy, deriving construct validity from past research. The emotional state will thus be 
produced by generating an experience resulting from viewing a very specific video clip. 
This experience of viewing a video clip, which past research in other fields has verified 
results in changes in autonomic nervous system behavior, will be labeled by subjects as a 
negative emotion. While in this study there is no use of direct physiological measures of 
the ANS, we use self report measures of the decision makers as indicators of the emotive 
experience. Numerous studies have validated these scales as appropriate indicators of the 
emotive state of the individual. 
 
Negative Affect  
Written material does not tend to invoke similar ANS changes but activates 
neural mechanisms associated with explicitly evaluative tasks. Therefore the negative 
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affect state will be created by presenting subjects with a written news event, a task which 
does not necessarily activate ANS responses and is thus unlikely to be labeled as an 
emotional state. Yet, the affective state should imply a negative evaluation of the 
individuals to the source of that affect. 
 
Control 
None of the above. As noted previously, contemporary research has begun to 
uncover direct links between emotional feeling states and physiological changes in 
neurological behavior. Changes in the human autonomic nervous system (ANS) have 
been linked to experiences of fear, anger, anxiety, and sadness (Damasio 1999; Labar et 
al. 1998; Anderson and Phelps 2002; Adolphs 1999; Ekman et al. 1983). Furthermore, 
changes in the ANS arising from emotional experiences have been manipulated using 
visual stimuli, such as pictures and video clips (Ekman 1992; Ekman et al. 1983; Gross 
and Levenson 1995; Puce et al. 1996; Gauthier et al. 1999). Changes in ANS activity—
physiological changes—are identified by subjects experiencing fear, anger, or sadness. 
Changes in ANS activity are thus reported or labeled as emotional experiences. To whit, 
subjects suffering from very particular brain lesions or who have experienced damage to 
the ventromedial frontal cortex (VM) area of the brain do not experience normal 
autonomic changes and thus fail to report experiencing subjective feelings in the 
presence of stimuli (Damasio 1994, 1999; Bechara et al. 1997). 
To summarize this important discussion, past research shows that visual stimuli 
such as pictures and video clips activate neuro-physiological processes which subjects 
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self-report as emotions. Using similar techniques, we will manipulate the same neuro-
physiological processes en route to generating negative emotions. Construct validity 
informs us that our use of visual measures similar to those used by past researchers to 
generate emotion will be successful. Thus, we suggest the operational definition of the 
independent variables—emotional/affective state—will be the ANS responses 
successfully manipulated via a video clip displaying negative and mildly distasteful 
images about an important foreign policy event (in the case of negative emotion) or the 
negative evaluations required from reading a written news story containing unpleasant 
information about an important foreign policy event (in the case of negative affect).  
Within the framework of uncovering similar evidence of the effects of emotional 
states within a real-world context, Section 7 will provide details of a case study designed 
to show how the independent variable state influenced (or did not influence) observers 
responses to the first and second attacks on the World Trade Center. An obvious and 
legitimate question pertains to the relevance of publicly expressed emotions, such as 
those found in the writings of newspaper editorials or letters to the editor, for any future 
discussion on their influence in foreign policy decision making. It is important to keep in 
mind here the caveat noted in the first section (see pp. 9-11) regarding a non-elite unit of 
analysis in this study. While there is an underlying assumption that all political 
observers—elite and non-elite—are influenced in a similar fashion by the effects of 
negative emotions, that assumption is not tested here.  The logical connection between 
the model discussed in this research and the effect of emotions on elite decision making 
behavior must be addressed elsewhere, or assumed indirectly, as would be the case if we 
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turned our attention to the connection between public opinion and foreign policy 
decision making (c.f. Holsti 1992; Hinckley 1992; Jentleson 1992; Iyengar 1989). To the 
extent that we draw a connection between public perceptions of international relations 
and the behavior of foreign policy decision makers, we can indirectly relate our findings 
here to elite behavior. Further testing of the direct role of emotions on elite foreign 
policy decision making using the model discussed in this study must of necessity be 
dealt with at a later time. 
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METHOD 
 
EXPERIMENTATION 
In the mid 1960s, Hedley Bull  criticized the increasing emphasis practitioners of 
International Relations had begun to place on quantification noting that, “The scientific 
approach has contributed and is likely to contribute very little to the theory of 
international relations” (1966:366).  Thirty years later the continuing development and 
refinement of methodological tools with which political scientists in all sub-disciplines 
gather and analyze data has not only contributed substantially to the evolution of 
political science theories, but tools once considered inapplicable to the analysis of socio-
political phenomena are widely accepted. The use of experimental and quasi-
experimental methods to gather data and refine political theories is one example of such 
an evolution.  
Testing of the hypothesis derived from the LoTES model will proceed from a 
multi-method approach: experimentation and case studies. The use of a multiple 
methodologies in addressing political phenomena allows the researcher to not only 
improve the development of theory which attempts to explain such phenomena (Brewer 
and Hunter 1989). Our use of both experiments and case studies in pursuit of further 
understanding the relationship between emotions and foreign policy perceptions can be 
enhanced through reliance on this multi-method tactic. Because of the sometimes 
controversial nature of experimentation in political science, and misunderstanding about 
our ability to generalize from experimental findings to understand real-world political 
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questions, a review of the logic behind experimentation in political science will be 
provided as well as a defense of the external validity of this approach.  While the subject 
of experimentation in political science has been dealt with in depth elsewhere 
(McDermott 2002a, 2002b) the following discussion of experimentation is intended to 
provide clarification of the standards sought within this research program and to place its 
findings within a larger, newer, and growing community of research. 
Kinder and Palfrey (1993:6) note that “experiments intrude upon nature . . . to 
find answers to causal questions.”  They further note that the diversity of experimental 
and quasi-experimental designs used by political scientists has grown considerably, with 
varying subjects and conditions.  However, a major criticism of experimentation within 
the social sciences centers on the ability to control variables and adequately randomize 
populations to be tested.  Kinder and Palfrey’s book, cited below, offers numerous 
examples of controlled and randomized experiments.  Furthermore, one can effectively 
argue that insisting upon perfect control is requiring that which few sciences employing 
experimental methods are able to achieve.  Nagel (1961) notes that perfect control in an 
experiment is an ideal, but that it is impossible in any experiment to control every 
variable but one. 
In Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research, Campbell and 
Stanley (1963) note several experiments as far back as 1923 that attempted to evaluate 
an imposed effect on a population.  The authors, who went on to provide what is still 
considered today a primer in the use of experimentation, focused on validity and the 
effect of randomization as the key elements in evaluating the efficacy of  experimental 
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methods.  Threats to internal validity such as history, maturation, testing, and statistical 
regression towards the mean were seen to be nullified if randomized control groups and 
pre-testing were part of the experimental process.  External threats to validity such as the 
interaction effects of testing and selection biases as well as reactive effects of 
experimental arrangements were viewed as more difficult to account for in experimental 
designs yet not entirely intractable. Using experimental methods in the study of political 
phenomena requires an understanding of the potential impediments researchers may 
face.  These obstacles fall broadly into two groups: operational and evaluative. 
 Evaluative limitations are those difficulties concerned with the validity of a 
political science experiment, namely, internal validity, external validity, and construct 
validity.  Threats to internal validity occur when, “the conditions under which an 
experiment is conducted produce systematic sources of variance that are irrelevant to the 
treatment variable and not under the control of the researcher” (Aronson et al. 
1986:477).  Mohr (1992) notes two primary sources of threat to internal validity: history 
and selection.  The effects of history include anything outside of the treatment that 
changes the tested subject.  Such effects include age, the effect of a pretest, external 
events, attrition or loss of test participants, and cyclical regression towards the mean.  
Selection effects are those changes that exist between comparison groups which may 
account for a change in the dependent variable of an experiment.  Comparison (or 
control) groups may be used to offset historical effects, however the groups themselves 
may have possessed differing attributes or characteristics that could account for a change 
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in the dependent variable.  Thus, the selection process may have failed to create 
equitable groups, thereby calling into question the results of an experiment.  
 External validity refers to “the extent to which a causal relationship . . . can 
safely be generalized to other times, places, and people” (Aronson et al. 1986:477).  To 
say that an observed causal effect takes place in a laboratory setting is not necessarily an 
indication that the same effect exists in the real world.  The conditions under which an 
experiment takes place, in terms of both environment and the populations used, can 
affect the experimental results in such a way as to invalidate any conclusions based upon 
the findings.  Examples of external validity criticisms pertaining to political science 
experiments include the fact that college students are often subjects, that experiments are 
often run on campuses, that multiple tests are sometimes used thereby sensitizing 
subjects to the treatment effect, or even that the race, gender, or age of the experiment’s 
administrators affect the outcome.  However, Mook’s (1983) caution pertaining to our 
interpretation of external validity should be noted.  Mook suggests that apart of applied 
studies, most experiments pertaining to social psychological phenomena are not intended 
to produce results generalizeable to a real-world population, but instead are intended to 
produce results which tell us something about the theory itself. Thus, as Mook notes, our 
understanding of social phenomena is derived “from theory or the analysis of 
mechanism; it is not a matter of ‘generalizing’ the findings themselves (ibid.:386). 
 Finally, the issue of construct validity follows from the aforementioned 
operational difficulty of experiments within political science.  Aronson et al. (1986) note 
that construct validity questions the extent to which the “operations and measures 
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embodied in the experimental procedures of a particular study reflect the theoretical 
concepts that gave rise to the research in the first place” (ibid:479).  An experiment 
designed to provide data regarding theoretical constructs requires the researcher to 
operationalize certain concepts and interpret treatment effects in certain ways.  If it is 
argued that an experimental treatment was not an adequate representation of the 
underlying theory, or that the results indicate something other than that which the 
political scientist suggest, then the construct validity of an experiment is being 
challenged. 
 Regardless of these potential limitations, and as noted earlier, a carefully 
designed experiment can not only provide strong support to a theory but can also 
minimize the above obstacles.  This is due for the most part in that the very design of a 
true experiment eliminates most threats to internal validity, and other steps can be taken 
to strengthen the external and construct validity of a given experiment. 
 Operational difficulties can be minimized primarily through research, though 
Kinder and Palfrey admit that certain problems of political science do not lend 
themselves to experimental research (Kinder and Palfrey 1993).  Substantial literature 
regarding experimental design exists in other social science disciplines such as 
psychology and economics. Similarly, a substantial and growing number of true 
experiments has been conducted by political scientists.  The variety of differing field and 
laboratory experiments in these fields of inquiry can provide the political scientist with 
ideas and suggestions for the implementation of his or her experiment. 
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 The use of control groups, randomization, and multiple measures can effectively 
eliminate most of the threats to validity mentioned previously.  A simple case study 
(denoted as: X > T > Y) illustrates the effect of control groups.  It is impossible in this 
case to say T caused Y.  Any of the threats to internal validity, especially external 
events, age, attrition, and regression could account for the change from X to Y.  If we 
add another group, exclude it from treatment, and analyze it at point Y, any change in 
the first group (Y1) not evident in the control group (Y2), may be a result of the 
treatment.  Because the control group allows the scientist to compare changes in Y1 and 
Y2, the effects of history are negated.   
Randomization allows the scientist to control the other internal threat to the 
experiment, namely selection.  Though the difference in control groups might be a result 
of the treatment, it may also be a result of the two groups.  Randomly assigning subjects 
to comparison groups as well as randomly assigning groups to treatments eliminates the 
threat of selection.  Randomization makes the control and test group effectively equal 
prior to the treatment, thereby excluding the possibility of selection bias (Mohr 1992).  
The effective use of control groups and randomization allows the political scientist a 
great measure of latitude in determining whether the treatment alone caused the 
observed effect.  While, as Nagel (1961) notes, it appears impossible to eliminate every 
potentially influential variable from an experiment except the treatment variable, the 
effective reduction of non-spuriousness, or the possibility that something other than the 
treatment caused the observed effect, is inherent in the true experiment’s use of control 
groups and randomization. 
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The greatest means of decreasing challenges to the external and construct validity 
of an experiment is through the use of multiple measures and replication.  If the theory 
being tested allows for different types of treatments or different subjects and settings, 
varying these will provide further data with which the relative strength of the theory can 
be evaluated.  The role of theory in the development of multiple tests is self-evident.  If 
the theory does not allow for differing treatments, using a variety of experimental 
designs can also strengthen claims of construct validity.  Experiments, especially those 
conducted in a laboratory setting, are most vulnerable in regards to external validity, 
though replication combined with some controls can assist in the strengthening of 
external validity.  For example, Aronson, Brewer, and Carlsmith note one experiment 
wherein the scientist successfully replicated his experiment in a field setting in order to 
control for the effect of environment in the results (Arsonson et al. 1986).  If the pure 
effect found in the laboratory can be replicated in the field, the strength of a theory is 
thus vastly improved. 
In short, the very design of the true experiment, centering around the use of 
control groups and randomization, controls for variance in a manner that decreases the 
potential of non-spuriousness and provides strength to any causal inference.  Threats to 
internal validity are inherently neutralized through the experimental process.  Claims 
against external validity do not in and of themselves discount claims of causality within 
the lab and can be addressed through the use of different techniques, selective replication 
(controlling for perceived threats to external validity), and experimental design (Kinder 
 59 
and Palfrey 1993).  Construct validity can likewise be strengthened by replicating an 
experiment with different measures.   
If, as noted at the beginning of this section, the aim of political science is to 
establish causal connections between phenomena, then the true experiment is the ideal 
conceptual and operational framework for political scientists to use in the development 
and testing of theories.  Though not all fields of political inquiry are amenable to 
experimentation, the concepts embodied within the design and process of the experiment 
applies to all research of political phenomena.  
 
OPERATIONALIZING EMOTION 
In order to proceed with such tests, it is further necessary to provide a valid and 
reliable operationalization of emotion. An attempt to operationalize the aforementioned 
definition of emotions is concerned with verifying how we can observe such a 
phenomenon as an emotion, and how we can know what we have seen is what we think 
it is.  We must turn in such instances to discussions of validity.  Within the scientific 
community, validity is primarily concerned with whether one is measuring what one 
thinks he or she is measuring (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996).  The validity of 
measures used to elicit emotions in subjects has produced a large number of studies 
within other fields of social scientific research.   
In experimental studies, emotions have been manipulated in many ways within 
the past social psychological research, including visual presentation of emotional 
materials (Hatfield et al. 1995; Newhagen 1998; Lerner, Goldberg and Tetlock 1998; 
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Mezzacappa et al. 1999), auditory manipulations (Hatfield et al. 1995; Niedenthal et al. 
1997; Masaoka and Homma 1997), odors (Robin et al. 1998), and other forms of sensory 
stimulation (Gerritsen et al. 1996; Crombez et al. 1998).   
One of the most common operationalizations of emotions is in the use of video 
clips (Pillard et al. 1974; Brown et al. 1977; Marston et al. 1984; Gross and Levenson 
1995; Palomba et al. 1997; Hagemann et al. 1999; Niedenthal et al. 2000). The emotions 
elicited include anger, saddness, fear, hatred, and joy, to name the most prominent.  The 
validity of these manipulations have been confirmed primarily through physiological 
observation (heart rate, facial EMG, skin conductance, positron emission tomography 
(PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI); and other measures (Mewborn 
and Rogers 1979; Hubert and de Jong-Meyer 1990; Maddock and Buonocore 1997) and 
self-reports—for which several scales have been developed (Watson et al. 1988; Izard 
1972).   
 
Experimental Procedure 
Overview  
Between 200-300 upper division college students at Texas A&M University were 
invited to participate this project. The research program consisted of three parts: (1) an 
experimental pretest of the materials to be used in experiments 1 and 2, (2) experiment 1 
which analyzed the impact of emotionally provoking video and written news media on 
the interpretation of international events, and (3) experiment 2 which analyzed the 
impact of emotionally provoking video and written news media on the processing of 
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information pertaining to international events.  The pretest was designed to determine 
the effectiveness of the video clip in generating an emotional response.  The video clip 
was designed to be similar to those seen on television.  Video material was drawn from 
stock news footage of crowds rejoicing over the deaths of US Marines in Mogadishu, 
Somalia on October 4, 1993.  Both video and written materials were presented as 
hypothetical scenarios involving the fictitious country of Manova. Both video and 
written materials were presented to subjects via computer software.  At the end of the 
video clip or written report subjects were asked to indicate on an anonymous 
questionnaire how they felt having viewed the information. 
In experiment 1 of the project, subjects were exposed to information about an 
unfolding international crisis. When subjects finished reviewing information about the 
scenario, they were given an anonymous post-experimental questionnaire.  The subjects 
were asked to indicate their responses to a number of inferential statements about the 
country and to recall as many items from the scenario as they could. 
In experiment 2 of the project, subjects were exposed to an unfolding 
international crisis for which they had to choose among hypothetical policy options. The 
decision maker controlled the in-flow of information about the crisis. The subjects were 
able to access information up to a point at which she/he picked one of the options or 
exhausted all the available information (then a choice had to be made on the basis of the 
information that had been reviewed). When subjects had finished reviewing information 
about the scenario and had made a choice, they were given an anonymous post-
experimental questionnaire. The subjects were asked to indicate how confident they 
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were with the choice and were asked to recall as many items from the scenarios as they 
could. 
Subjects 
247 upper division college students from Texas A&M University participated in 
these experiments. The pretests were conducted using 44 students.  In the pretest, 
subjects were randomly assigned to one of 3 experimental conditions. Experiment 1 was 
conducted using 101 students.  In Experiment 1, subjects were randomly assigned to one 
of nine experimental conditions.  Experiment 2 was be conducted using 102 students. In 
Experiment 2, subjects were be randomly assigned to one of nine experimental 
conditions.  Subjects were not students in classes in which the principal investigator was 
an instructor. 
Design 
Pretest of the research material for evaluation of experiments 1 and 2: 
This was a simple pre-test designed to determine the effectiveness of news items 
and news clips in generating emotional responses. Subjects were randomly assigned to 
one of three conditions.  Condition 1 consisted of a short video news clip.  Condition 2 
consisted of a short news story which reported in written form the information provided 
in the video in Condition 1.  Condition 3 consisted of a short description of a 
hypothetical political problem occurring between the US and a fictitious country.  The 
dependent variable was the self-reported emotional response to the visual or written 
news items. 
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Nineteen undergraduate students (obtained from the same pool of participants for 
the experiments) were involved in the pre-test of the emotional/affective manipulation. 
In the neutral condition the subjects were exposed merely to the basic scenario of the 
international crisis, in the affective treatment the subjects read the written version of the 
news report, and in the emotional treatment subjects viewed the full audio/video clip. 
Following the exposure to one of the three treatments, the students responded on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 10 whether they experienced one of the following emotional reactions: 
Anger; Hate; Sympathy; Fear towards the Manovans. 
Table 1 illustrates the means of subjects’ responses as a function of the treatment. 
The responses suggest the effectiveness of the manipulation along three of the four 
emotions.  The only case where the treatment did not yield a statistically significant 
effect was along the fear dimension.  
 
  Table 1. Pretest Results for Emotional and Affective Manipulations 
 Angry Hate Sympathetic Fear 
Emotive state     
Control 1.17 .17 1.17 1.33 
Written  6.00 2.00 1.67 1.50 
Video Clip 9.43 7.29 .29 .86 
F 206.97 
p<.0001 
88.63 p<.0001 4.42 p<.03 .57 ns 
 
To test the effectiveness of the valence manipulation we asked 25 other students 
(taken from the same subjects pool we used in the experiments) to read the items of a 
particular set of information and to form an impression of that nation on a scale ranging 
from –5 to +5. The effect of the manipulation is statistically significant, F(2,22)=39.05 
p<.0001. The positive set of items led to a more positive impression of Manova 
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(M=3.33) than the mixed set (M=.25) and the ‘worst impression’ was in the negative set 
(M=-4.13).8  
As mentioned previously, the logic underlying the operational definition of 
emotion used here relies upon the idea that past research shows that visual stimuli such 
as pictures and video clips activate neuro-physiological processes which subjects self-
report as emotions. Using similar techniques, we will manipulate the same neuro-
physiological processes en route to generating negative emotions. Construct validity 
informs us that our use of visual measures similar to those used by past researchers to 
generate emotion will be successful. Thus, we suggest that the independent variables-
emotional/affective state-will be successfully manipulated via a video clip displaying 
negative and mildly distasteful images about an important foreign policy event (in the 
case of negative emotion) or via a written news story containing unpleasant information 
about an important foreign policy event (in the case of negative affect).  
Experiment 1: 
This experiment was designed to assess the degree to which emotional responses 
to news reports influenced the evaluation and interpretation of political events. The 
experiment consisted of a 3x3 factorial design in which the factors were the 
emotional/affective manipulation (video clip, news report, or none) and valence of 
country description (mixed [50% positive, 50% negative], positive [80% positive, 20% 
negative], or negative [80% negative, 20% positive]). Subjects were randomly assigned 
to one of nine conditions. In all conditions, subjects reviewed a hypothetical political 
problem occurring between the US and a fictitious country.  The first manipulation 
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(video news report, written news report, or none) was followed by the country 
description manipulation, which consists of a short essay of descriptive information 
about the fictitious country in question. Dependent variables included recall of 
information and inferences about the country in the scenario. 
Experiment 2: 
This experiment was designed to assess the degree to which emotional responses 
to news reports influenced the processing of information about an important political 
event. The experiment consisted of a 3x2x2 between-group design in which the factors 
were the emotional/affective manipulation (video clip, news report, or none) and valence 
of country description (mixed [50% positive, 50% negative], positive [80% positive, 
20% negative], or negative [80% negative, 20% positive]). Subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of nine conditions. In all conditions, subjects reviewed a hypothetical 
political problem occurring between the US and a fictitious country and were asked to 
make a decision about what the US response to the problem should be. After the 
introduction, the first manipulation (video news report, written news report, or none) was 
followed by the country description manipulation, which consisted of a sequence of 
descriptive information items about the fictitious country in question.   Dependent 
variables included choice, the amount of time taken to view the scenario, the number of 
items viewed, the average amount of time taken to view each item of information, and 
recall of information from the scenario. 
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Instrument 
In the pretest, experiment 1 and experiment 2, subjects were exposed to 
information as presented to them via computer.  A computerized program allowed 
subjects to review information and then, by clicking on the appropriate button, review a 
new item of information.  This procedure was followed until the subject was informed 
by the computer application to answer questions pertaining to the information items 
viewed.  Written responses were collected on anonymous handouts. 
Procedure 
 In the pretest, experiment 1 and experiment 2, subjects were seated at individual 
computer terminals in the Foreign Policy Decision Making lab of the Political Science 
department at Texas A&M University and were instructed in the use of the computer 
application before being asked to begin reviewing information.  Subjects started 
reviewing information by clicking on a button in the software which began the sequence 
of information. At the appropriate time, subjects were informed when they should click 
the button again to view the next piece of information.  At the end of the material, 
subjects were informed that they should complete a questionnaire. Upon completion of 
the pretest, experiment 1 and experiment 2, all subjects were debriefed about the 
theoretical and empirical context of the project. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
 
In line with the current research which stresses the importance of problem 
representation (Billings and Hermann 1998), and the definition of the situation (Voss 
1998; Sylvan and Voss 1998), the interpretation of an event is of critical importance to 
the understanding of foreign policy decision making. Event interpretation primarily 
revolves around the concept of making sense of some occurrence. While interpretation of 
any event is fundamentally cognitive, the model suggests that emotions may impact 
cognitions relevant to stimuli. An event can be interpreted, or made sense of, in a 
number of ways.  One way in which event interpretation can be represented is by 
analyzing the attributions, evaluations and inferences individuals make about an object.  
Subjects who hate or are distressed by the actions of another country will make 
inferences about that actor’s motives, intentions, and qualities in a far different manner 
than one who does not feel any particular emotion toward that person.  
Two main hypotheses about event interpretation have been derived from the 
propositions noted earlier.  First, in contrast to negative affect, the influence of negative 
emotions on event interpretation should be seen in 1) less processing time devoted to 
new information, and 2) less attention to new information as measured by recall of 
items. Second, we expect an interaction between an emotive state of the perceiver and 
the valence of information he or she has to interpret. 
Negative affect should be reinforced by exposure to negative information about 
the actor, or modified by exposure to positive information about the actor. Individuals 
 68 
experiencing negative affect toward a target, but who have been subsequently exposed to 
positive information about that target should make fewer negative inferences and 
attributions about the characteristics of that actor, and recall fewer negative items of 
information, than individuals who experience negative affect toward a target but who 
have been subsequently exposed to negative information about that target.  
On the other hand, a reduced effect is expected between the presence of negative 
emotions toward an international actor and the valence of new information about that 
actor.  Negative emotion is not altered by exposure to positive or negative information 
about the actor.  Thus, individuals experiencing negative emotion toward a target, but 
who have subsequently been exposed to positive information about that target should 
make as many negative inferences and attributions about the characteristics of that actor, 
and recall as many negative items of information, as individuals who experience 
negative emotion toward a target and who have subsequently been exposed to negative 
information about that target. In short, a negative emotional state attenuates the impact 
of valenced information, while negative affect may augment it.  Put more clearly, the 
LoTES model suggests that the main effect of an emotional state on event interpretation 
will be seen in a bias in terms of the type or content of information focused on, and the 
amount of information focused on: 
H1: A negative emotional state will lead to less time spent processing new 
information (in contrast to negative affect or the control condition). 
 
H2:  A negative emotional state will lead to less attention to new information as 
measured by recall of items (in contrast to negative affect or the control 
condition). 
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Furthermore, the LoTES model suggests an interaction between cognitive and 
emotional systems which will lead to differences in how individuals interpret events 
based on the independent variable state. An evaluative state of negative affect can be 
mediated by new information, thus: 
H3:  Negative affect followed by exposure to positive information will result in 
fewer negative inferences and attributions than a condition of negative 
affect followed by negative information.  
 
H4:  Negative affect followed by exposure to positive information will result in 
less recall of negative items of information than a condition of negative 
affect followed by negative information.  
 
On the other hand, negative emotion is not altered by exposure to positive or 
negative information about the actor.   
H5:  A negative emotional state followed by exposure to positive information 
will result in as many negative inferences and attributions as a negative 
emotional state followed by exposure to negative information. 
 
H6:  A negative emotional state followed by exposure to positive information 
will result in the same amount of recall of negative items of information as 
a negative emotional state followed by exposure to negative information. 
 
It is important to reiterate that emotion is operationalized here as the response to 
the video stimulus and affect is operationalized as the response to the written material 
(see Section 3 pp. 47-51). 
 
METHOD 
To test the hypotheses, an experiment was designed around a hypothetical 
international crisis concerning the fictitious island nation of Manova. The crisis involved 
the taking of American and foreign hostages at the US embassy by armed local rioters, 
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an attempt by US soldiers to rescue the hostages, and the subsequent execution of some 
American hostages. We employed a computerized process tracing instrument similar to 
that used in previous studies (Geva et al. 2000; Geva and Skorick 1999). The program 
presents written, audio, and visual information in a controlled setting while recording 
subjects behavior.  
 
Subjects and Design 
101 upper division college students from Texas A&M University participated in 
the main phase of the experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of nine 
experimental conditions.  
The experiment was structured as a 3 x 3 between groups factorial design. The 
manipulated factors were: (a) affective/emotional manipulation (video clip, written text, 
or none), and (b) the valence of the information describing the target nation (positive, 
negative and mixed). The dependent variables addressed processing parameters 
(processing time and information recall), and the interpretation of the event. 
 
Instrument and Procedure 
The Manova Case 
All subjects were informed that they would be exposed to events ongoing 
between the US and Manova and would be asked to make some sense out of what is 
going on in Manova. Following this, all subjects were introduced to the Manovan crisis 
via the following description: 
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Manova is a country on an island in the Gulf of Guinea. Since the end of World War 2, Manova 
has been a member of the Organization of African States. It has historically had a good 
relationship with the United States and, since 1973, has been an important port for US Naval 
ships.  Because of its strategic location, Manova has allowed US vessels to use its ports for 
refueling, repair, and crew leisure. 
         
An agreement reached in 1995 with the Foreign Affairs Office of Manova allowed some US and 
foreign personnel to establish temporary residence in Manova.  However, a recent measure in the 
Manovan elections called for the removal of US military housing from Manova. Though the 
ballot measure lost, a number of Manovans protested against the US presence, some of them 
demanding that the Manovan government no longer allow access to US Naval ships in its ports.  
Other Manovan officials have publicly stated that these protesters are a radical minority. 
 
This morning you have learned that civil unrest has broken out in the capital of Manova.  Initial 
details are sketchy but it appears that some US military and embassy personnel, as well as a 
small number of foreign diplomats, are being held hostage at an unknown location in the capital 
of Manova. 
 
The Affective/Emotive Manipulation 
Emotional manipulation was done via the use of an audio visual account of the 
events unfolding in Manova and was fashioned after a typical “on the scene” news 
report. The short video (approx. 1 minute in length) depicted riots by Manovans, 
described the execution of American hostages, and showed American bodies being 
dragged through the streets by reveling Manovans.9   
The affective manipulation was introduced using a written account of the same 
event, i.e. the audio portion in writing, without accompanying video. The text of the 
affective manipulation read:   
Events in Manova took a dramatic turn today as protests over the US and Western presence in 
Manova turned violent. As early as yesterday, bands of armed men were seen roaming through 
the streets of the capital, calling for an uprising against the current government and all Western 
nations.  Then, without warning, the city seemed to explode this morning as militia groups began 
cruising through the city destroying American, British, and French business offices and shooting 
at suspected foreigners. However, the most dramatic event occurred hours ago as armed groups 
attempted to storm the US embassy and take hostages.  In fact, it appears that they were initially 
successful as a small group of US and foreign diplomats was captured at the outset. A US marine 
unit was dispatched to rescue the Americans and was able to do so only after a fierce gun battle 
with armed Manovans. However, several other Americans and foreigners were not rescued and 
 72 
were executed by Manovan crowds. Afterward, their bodies were dragged through the streets by 
cheering Manovans. At the moment the State Department has no comment on this situation. 
 
A control condition was included in which subjects received neither a written or 
audio/visual story, but instead skipped directly to the information series.  
The Valence of the Information 
Following the emotional/affective manipulation, subjects were informed that, 
“As a context in which to gain better insight into what is happening in Manova, you can 
now view additional information about Manova gathered from news and governmental 
sources.” Subjects were randomly assigned to review one of three possible information 
sets, a positive, negative, or mixed set of information.  Each set consisted of 22 items of 
information. The positive set consisted of 18 positive and 4 negative items of 
information. Items were considered positive if they suggested that Manova or Manovans 
were similar to the US or sympathetic to US interests. Examples included, “Recently 
unclassified US intelligence documents indicate that the Manovan diplomatic corps 
helped US agents during times of peak Cold War hostilities,” and "Manova has long 
stood in support of the US role in the Organization of South Aegean States and has 
regularly voted in support of US interests in the region."  The negative set consisted of 
18 negative and 4 positive items of information. Items were considered positive if they 
suggested that Manova or Manovans were dissimilar to the US or antagonistic to US 
interests. Examples included, "In recent years, the Manovan military has been accused 
by opposition and Western human rights agencies of corruption and brutality against its 
citizens," and "The Manovan government has recently, and without explanation, 
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expelled all foreign western missionaries and has seized all of their property and 
belongings, giving the westerners only 24 hours to leave the country or face detention 
and arrest." The mixed set consisted of 11 positive and 11 negative items of information.  
The Procedure 
Subjects were seated at individual computer terminals in the computer lab of the 
political science department and were instructed in the use of the computer application 
before being asked to begin reviewing information.  In accordance with the goal of 
testing hypotheses related to the interpretation of information, subjects were informed at 
the start of the experiment that their task was to make some sense of events occurring in 
Manova. The computerized software guided subjects through each section of the 
experiment. Following the affective/emotional manipulation, subjects were presented 
with the additional information as described above. The program allowed subjects to 
review an item of information and then, by clicking on the button labeled “next item,” 
review a new item. Subjects were required to review all 22 items of information prior to 
moving to the final section of the experiment wherein which dependent variable 
measures were introduced. Upon completion of the experiment, all subjects were 
debriefed about the theoretical and empirical context of the experiment. 
 
RESULTS 
This experiment attempted to differentiate between affective and emotive 
influences on event interpretation in the context of an international crisis. The findings 
reported in this regard are divided into two. The first set of results pertains to effects of 
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affect and emotion on processing parameters. The second set addresses these effects for 
inferences and judgments the participants made on the target nation, i.e., their 
interpretation of the information.  
 
Affect and Emotion in the Processing of International Crisis Information 
The basic premise implies that negative emotions (hate and anger) will lower the 
processing threshold more than an affective state, and that this effect will be expressed in 
the time participants spend acquiring/processing information.  
The 3 x 3 ANOVA yielded the following results. First, a weak trend (on the 
verge of statistical significance) was found in which the emotion condition (video clip) 
generated faster processing time (M=175.88 sec) than the affective treatment 
(M=187.04), and the control conditions (M=191.33), F(2,91)=2.89 p<.06. This trend is 
compatible with expectations. Second, a two-way interaction was obtained between the 
emotive state and the type of information subjects processed [F(4,91)=3.72 p<.005]. The 
pattern of the interaction is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Within the experimental conditions of mixed-information and positive-
information emotions, as expected, decreased the time spent on acquiring information. 
The distinction between emotion and affect can be observed especially in the condition 
of mixed information. There, where the information is complex (mixed), affect increased 
process time while the emotion treatment reduced processing time. In other words, 
emotions dampened more processing when actually the situation demanded it, while 
affect was more in tune to the increased demand. 
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     Figure 2. Processing Time as a Function of Experimental Condition 
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Finally, in the face of negative information about the target nation, it is surprising 
to note that emotion was actually associated with an increase in processing time as 
compared to the effects of affect, which decreased processing time.  Hence, it seems that 
“emotional” processing is faster than the other modes for complex and thematically 
inconsistent information, while similar to the other affective and neutral modes when the 
processing entails negative, i.e., thematically consistent information.    
The second processing parameter is unforewarned free recall that was used as an 
indirect measure of how much attention subjects paid to the information they have seen 
(see Geva et al. 2000). A lowered processing threshold would imply that the subjects 
who were required to go over all the items in the information set did that ritualistically 
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rather than paying close attention to each item. Shifts in attention would be expressed in 
the accuracy of their recall.10  In the first analysis the total number of items subjects 
recalled is reported. 
The overall recall was not high (about 7 of 22 items). Generally, the affect 
treatment led to more recall (M=7.61) than did the emotion treatment (M=6.21) or the 
control  (M=6.50), F(2,91)=4.19 p <.05.  Once more this trend coincides with the 
proposition of an emotional state as potentially suppressing attention. However, if 
attention to incoming information is thematically mediated, then it is important to 
examine whether the emotive states influenced differently the retrieval of positive versus 
negative items from the information sets. Since each of the three sets contained a 
different distribution of positive and negative items, the proportion of accurate recall of 
positive and negative items in relation to their number in a specific set was analyzed. 
Thus, the proportion of recall of a particular valence of items served as the repeated 
measure in a 3 x 3 x 2 ANOVA. 
The first finding reported from this analysis pertains to the interaction of the 
emotion/affective manipulation with the items’ sub-category (positive vs. negative), 
F(2,91)=12.83 p<.0001. Figure 3 illustrates the pattern.  In the control condition, 
subjects recalled a higher proportion of positive items (.40) than negative items (.23). 
This result may represent a salience effect whereas the positive items are actually 
inconsistent with general story line of the initial scenario (c.f. Hastie and Kumar 1979).   
However, in both affective/emotive conditions the trend was reversed, i.e., a higher 
recall level of negative (consistent items with both the story and with the affect/emotion 
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inducement) than positive information. It seems that the negative affect and emotion led 
the participants to pay more attention to “confirming” negative information than to 
thematically “disconfirming” information. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of Items Recalled As a Function of Emotional/Affective 
Manipulation 
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The other significant interaction is between the valence of the information sets 
and the proportion of recall of the two sub-categories of information (positive negative), 
F(2,91)=8.92 p<.0003. As portrayed in Figure 4 the main source for the interaction is the 
spike in the proportion of recall of positive information in the positive valence sets. This 
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increase in attention may well express the inconsistency effect of this set of information 
to the initial story of the crisis and especially to the affective/emotional treatments. 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of Items Recalled As a Function of Information Valence  
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Finally the ANOVA yielded a significant three way interaction of the emotive 
state, the information set, and the specific category of recall [F(4,91)=3.75 p<.01).  The 
complex interaction that is portrayed in Figure 5 suggests the following points. First, 
when the information set is mixed (and hence cognitively more demanding for an 
interpretation task)– i.e. includes the same number of positive and negative items –  only 
participants in a negative emotional state express a confirming thematic bias and tend to 
recall a higher proportion of negative than positive items.  In this information condition 
(mixed) such a thematic bias was absent both for control and for the affect induced 
participants. This thematic bias was specifically hypothesized in the model. While the 
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control participants exhibited a similar pattern of attention to the positive information in 
both “lop-sided” information sets (negative and positive), the affect/emotion induced  
 
Figure 5. Proportion of Items Recalled as a Function of Information Valence and 
Emotional/Affective Manipulation 
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subjects demonstrated differential patterns of attention.  In general, both inductions led 
to a confirming bias – recalling a higher proportion of negative items. Yet, in the 
negative set, the emotive subjects had a reversed pattern and recalled more the 
inconsistent positive items. Thus emotional participants were more thematically biased 
than affective subjects in a mixed information condition, less biased in a negative set, 
and about the same biased in the positive information set.  
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Inferences and Judgment of the Target Nation as a Function of Emotive States 
Variations were expected in the valence of the sequential information sets to 
influence the interpretation of the crisis and particularly the perception of Manova and 
its people. Moreover, it was hypothesized that negative emotion will suppress the effects 
of the different contents compared to the influence of an affective induction and the 
control conditions.  The responses of the subjects addressed several dimensions: How 
democratic is Manova? How similar is that country to the USA? How likely is that 
country to negotiate in a context of crisis? 
The findings suggest that along these three dimensions the information sets had a 
significant effect. The positive valence set led to more favorable impressions than the 
mixed sets, while the least favorable impressions were generated when the valence was 
mainly negative. These results are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Inferences and Judgment of the Target Nation as a Function of 
Information Valence 
 Valence of Information Set 
Dimension Negative Mixed Positive F(2,91) 
Similar 1.91 3.58 5.57   39.12 p<.0001 
Democratic  .88 4.15 6.29 111.98 p<.0001 
Trustworthy 2.19 3.52 5.17  26.95  p<.0001 
Negotiate 1.84 4.82 5.77  50.16  p<.0001 
 
 
The ‘suppressive’ effect of emotion – which should be expressed as an 
interaction between the emotive manipulation and the valence of the set – was obtained 
along all these dimensions. Specifically, the proposition suggests that when we compare 
the interpretation of the three sets of information that have different valences, the 
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emotive manipulation would lead to a small gap between the impressions based on 
positive information than those based on negative information as compared to parallel 
gaps generated by control or affect induced subjects. Thus, the emotion carries an extra 
amount of “information” that overrides in part the message of the items describing the 
target nation. Table 3 illustrates the gap between the impression based on positive and 
negative information sets generated by the emotive subjects and those in the other two 
conditions (affect and control) along each of the above mentioned dimensions (the 
mixed sets were always an in between value).  
 
Table 3. The Gap in Inferences and Judgments of the Target Nation (Between 
Positive and Negatively Valenced Information Sets in the Different Emotive States)  
 Negative Emotion Negative Affect Control  
Dimension Pos. 
Items 
Neg. 
Items 
The 
Gap 
Pos. 
Items 
Neg. 
Items 
The 
Gap 
Pos. 
Items 
Neg. 
Items 
The 
Gap 
F(4,91) 
Interaction 
Similar 4.36 2.39 1.97 5.92 1.22 4.70 7.00 1.90 5.10 4.23 
p<.005 
Democratic 5.24 1.15 4.09 6.75 .56 6.19 7.33 .80 6.53 5.78 
p<.0005 
Trustworthy 4.07 1.92 2.15 5.50 1.67 3.83 6.44 3.00 3.44 3.24  
p<.02 
Negotiate 5.14 1.92 3.22 6.50 2.44 4.06 5.78 1.20 4.58 4.90  
p<.005 
 
The smaller gaps in the emotive condition are the source for the statistically 
significant interaction between the experimental factors and specifically support this 
contention. It is not that the valence of information is totally ignored. The main effect of 
the information sets validates the idea that the information matters. Yet the pattern of the 
interaction implies that emotion - rather than affect - decreases the reliance on the 
information or effects the interpretation (mediated by attention). Figure 7 further shows 
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this dampening effect of emotion on cognitions.  This interaction between the emotional 
state and cognitions—particularly the suppressive effect of negative emotions on 
inferences made by subjects viewing both positive and negative sets of information—
highlights not only the effect of emotion on interpretation of events (through the 
processing of attribution and inference), but also suggests a difference in this regard 
between affect and emotion. Figure 6 provides a visual representation of this finding that 
the size of difference in inferences for subjects in the emotion condition was smaller 
than the size of difference in inferences for subjects in the affect condition. Thus 
negative affect provided wider variance in inferences about Manovans than did the 
negative emotional state. 
 
Figure 6. Difference in Mean Inferences between Positive and Negative Sets of 
Information 
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Whereas our findings here in regards to negative affect support those of Marcus’ 
and colleagues (1988, 2000; Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Marcus et al. 1998) that 
negative affect increases vigilance, our findings in regards to emotion are different: 
emotions decreased vigilance in this case.  Even more so, it should be noted that these 
findings provide initial support for the non-linear difference, or step-level increase, 
between emotion and affect. While we are unable to ascertain this nonlinearity 
statistically from these findings given the categorical nature of the dependent variable, 
they support the hypothesis that the difference between the effects of emotion and affect 
is substantially greater than the difference between an affective state and the control 
state. Future research will have to employ additional methodologies and techniques to 
further test for non-linearity.  
Finally, the above findings are interesting because when we explore the main-
effects of the emotive manipulation on the judgments of the target nation we obtain only 
two significant main-effects. The subjects in the negative emotion condition attributed 
less of a likelihood that Manova would resort to negotiation (M=3.33) than did subjects 
in  the condition of negative affect (M=5.64) or control (M=3.71 F(2,91)=15.09 p<.0001,  
In addition, emotion led subjects to perceive Manova as less similar (M=3.13) than 
under conditions of affect (M=4.21) and control (M=4.04), F(2,91)=3.38 p<.05. Along 
the other dimensions the emotive state lowered evaluations but did not do so in a 
significantly different manner from other conditions. 
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DISCUSSION 
 In this section it was argued that emotions have a different status and different 
effects from affect.  It is possible to argue that an intensity gradient was merely 
introduced in the emotive dimension, and thus the manipulation, for instance, is just such 
a case. However, while the manipulation is definitely an increase in grade, the expected 
changes should represent a qualitative change. In terms of processing parameters we find 
demonstrated changes on the influence of emotion and affect.  The findings are, 
however, less consistent with regard to their effects on interpretation. It is expected that 
there should be even stronger results in cases requiring the need to make a decision. 
An interesting note to make of the findings reported here concerns the interaction 
of mixed information sets and the emotional state. The mixed information set consisted 
of an equal number of positive and negative items of information and was thus viewed as 
being cognitively more demanding to deal with than more consistent sets of negative and 
positive information. Nonetheless, our results showed that subjects having to make sense 
of this more complicated collection of information in the mixed set recalled a higher 
proportion of negative information. Only subjects in the emotion condition displayed 
this thematic bias in their recall. Overall, our results suggest a trend towards supportive 
findings for subjects dealing with mixed sets of information and less of a tendency for 
similarly supportive findings in either the positive or negative information sets. With 
some exceptions, conditions of mixed-information in conjunction with emotional state 
yielded supportive findings. This may be considered a finding in itself as the mixed 
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information sets are viewed as being less “predictable” in real world terms and thus 
more demanding in terms of effort.  
Some findings are not as supportive and more problematic. Why was the emotion 
condition associated with greater processing time of negative information as compared 
to negative affect? The model clearly expects the opposite effect. One underlying trend 
may be an interaction between congruency of emotion and information. It is possible 
that the emotional system “slows down” at times when dealing with consistent 
information, possibly in order to strengthen the link between feelings of threat and 
associative cognitions. On the other hand, inconsistent or more complicated information 
(i.e. mixed) must be dealt with more quickly in order to stave off any potential threat.  
It should also be noted that our results supported the idea of a dampening or 
standardizing effect of emotion. When we compared the inferences derived from the 
three sets of information with different valences, the emotional state led to a small “gap” 
between inferences based on positive as opposed to negative information. Our 
interpretation of this important finding is that emotion is having a “standardizing” effect 
on the way people make sense of events. In this case, it resulted in inferences of subjects 
who viewed both positive and negative sets of information being “closer” to each other 
than individuals who had been in the negative affect condition.   
This research represents the first attempt of this research program to inter-relate 
affect, emotion and cognition in the study of international relations and particularly in 
foreign policy decision making. This task is difficult given the understanding that even 
the study of cognition is little well-received within the field, and that the utility of 
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experimental methods is often questioned. However, recent events have made political 
scientists more cognizant of symbolic aspects of international relations as well as the 
need to include emotions in the equation.  This approach and experiment are unique in 
that emotion and affect are juxtaposed against each other. The findings in terms of affect 
are in agreement with Marcus and his colleagues: negative affect has the potential to 
increase vigilant attention to the environment. However, in accord with ancient Greek 
logic, the claim can also be made that hate and anger and probably fear ‘blind’ the 
individual. 
However, while our findings here report the effects of the independent variable 
state on the interpretation of foreign policy events, it is necessary to push the analysis 
further. If the definition of the situation—particularly that situational form referred to as 
the crisis situation (Hermann 1969a, 1969b; Billings and Hermann 1998)—is linked to 
different policy choices, then the emotional state of the perceiver may be an important 
mediating variable linking situational interpretation to choice. If, as the model suggests 
here, the presence of an emotional state interacts with cognitions about the environment 
and thus leads to biases in interpretation, it stands to reason that choices about “what 
ought to be done” will be thus linked to similar processes. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin 
(2002:72) note, “certain objective properties of a situation will be partly responsible for 
the reactions and orientations of the decision-makers and that assignment of properties to 
a situation by the decision-makers is indicative of clues to the rule which may have 
governed their particular responses” [emphasis mine].  The LoTES model suggests, 
however, that the rule or set of rules which may govern particular responses is not 
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limited to the objective properties of a situation but is also implicated by the subjective, 
i.e. felt, properties of a situation. Given this connection to interpretation, the next logical 
variable of inquiry is that of choice in relation to a political problem. The following 
section discusses results of an experiment designed to address the effects of the 
independent variable states of emotion and affect on choice pertaining to a political 
problem. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Ample research suggests the importance of understanding the processes used by 
individuals to arrive at a decision (Snyder et al. 2002; Fiske and Taylor 1991). Mintz and 
Geva (1997) note that knowing the decision processes used by individuals helps analysts 
understand why certain choices are made over others. As noted previously, conventional 
foreign policy decision making research has been characterized by a tension between 
focusing on underlying cognitive processes inherent within the decision making context 
in favor of theoretical approaches which stress adherence to rationality assumptions. 
Adherence to assumptions of rationality sacrifice process validity for the sake of 
outcome validity (ibid). However, if the emotional content of information used by 
decision makers influences the manner in which political events are interpreted and 
perceived, then it is no leap of faith to suggest that emotions influence foreign policy 
choices.  
This section reports results of an experiment design to test the general 
proposition that negative emotions influence decision making by introducing a thematic 
effect on the amount and type of information used by individuals to arrive at a choice. 
As suggested in Section 5, a strong difference – a dramatic step – exists between a 
negative affective evaluation and the existence or occurrence of negative emotion.  The 
theory put forth in this research program holds that this non-linear step accounts not only 
for the interpretation of information, but also the differentiation in information 
processing and choice. 
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Three main hypotheses about information processing can be derived from the 
propositions noted earlier.  First, in contrast to negative affect, the influence of negative 
emotions in the context of a foreign policy choice should be seen in fewer items of 
information accessed and less processing time devoted to new information. Second, the 
influence of negative emotions in the context of a foreign policy choice should be seen 
in less attention to new information as measured by recall of items. Third, the theory 
expects an interaction between an emotive state of the perceiver and the valence of 
information he or she has to interpret. This interaction should be seen in a difference 
between the number of positive vs. negative items processed by individuals. This 
difference will be larger for those who have negative affect than individuals who have 
negative emotion or no emotion.  Similarly, the difference between the amount of time 
spent processing positive vs. negative items by individuals who have negative affect will 
be larger than that processed by individuals who have negative emotion or no emotion. 
A brief reiteration of the theoretical underpinning of these hypotheses follows.  
The LoTES model suggests that negative affect is either reinforced by exposure 
to negative information about the actor, or modified by exposure to positive information 
about the actor. Thus, individuals who hold a negative evaluation (i.e. negative affect) of 
a target, but who have been subsequently exposed to positive (i.e. dissonant) information 
about that target should spend more time processing information about the 
characteristics of that actor, and recall fewer negative items of information, than 
individuals who experience negative affect toward a target but who have been 
subsequently exposed to negative information about that target.  
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On the other hand, because the model suggests that negative emotions are not 
altered by exposure to positive or negative information about an actor, individuals 
experiencing negative emotion toward a target, but who have subsequently been exposed 
to positive information about that target should make as many negative inferences and 
attributions about the characteristics of that actor, and recall as many negative items of 
information, as individuals who experience negative emotion toward a target and who 
have subsequently been exposed to negative information about that target. Thus, the 
negative emotional state dissipates the impact of valenced information, while negative 
affect may enhance it. 
 
METHOD 
 
To test the hypotheses, the experimental scenario discussed in the previous 
section was modified. Again, this scenario concerns the fictitious island nation of 
Manova and the taking of American and foreign hostages at the US embassy by armed 
local rioters, an attempt by US soldiers to rescue the hostages, and the subsequent 
execution of some American hostages. As conducted in the first experiment, a 
computerized process tracing instrument was employed (Geva et al. 2000; Geva and 
Skorick 1999). The program presents written, audio, and visual information in a 
controlled setting while recording subjects behavior.  
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Subjects and Design  
102 upper division college students from Texas A&M University participated in 
the main phase of the experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of nine 
experimental conditions.  
The experiment was structured as a 3 x 3 between groups factorial design. The 
manipulated factors were: (a) affective/emotional manipulation (video clip, written text, 
or none), and (b) the valence of the information describing the target nation (positive, 
negative and mixed). The dependent variables addressed information processing 
parameters (processing time and information recall). 
 
Instrument and Procedure 
The Manova case: All subjects were informed that they would be exposed to 
events ongoing between the US and Manova and would be asked to make some sense out 
of what is going on in Manova. Following this, all subjects were introduced to the 
Manovan crisis via the following description: 
Manova is a country on an island in the Gulf of Guinea. Since the end of World War 2, 
Manova has been a member of the Organization of African States. It has historically had 
a good relationship with the United States and, since 1973, has been an important port 
for US Naval ships.  Because of its strategic location, Manova has allowed US vessels to 
use its ports for refueling, repair, and crew leisure. 
         
An agreement reached in 1995 with the Foreign Affairs Office of Manova allowed some 
US and foreign personnel to establish temporary residence in Manova.  However, a 
recent measure in the Manovan elections called for the removal of US military housing 
from Manova. Though the ballot measure lost, a number of Manovans protested against 
the US presence, some of them demanding that the Manovan government no longer 
allow access to US Naval ships in its ports.  Other Manovan officials have publicly 
stated that these protesters are a radical minority. 
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This morning you have learned that civil unrest has broken out in the capital of Manova.  
Initial details are sketchy but it appears that some US military and embassy personnel, as 
well as a small number of foreign diplomats, are being held hostage at an unknown 
location in the capital of Manova. 
 
The Affective/Emotive Manipulation 
Emotional manipulation was done via the use of an audio visual account of the 
events unfolding in Manova and was fashioned after a typical “on the scene” news 
report. The short video (approximately one minute in length) depicted riots by 
Manovans, described the execution of American hostages, and showed American bodies 
being dragged through the streets by reveling Manovans.11   
The affective manipulation was introduced using a written account of the same 
event, i.e. the audio portion in writing, without accompanying video. The text of the 
affective manipulation read:   
Events in Manova took a dramatic turn today as protests over the US and Western 
presence in Manova turned violent. As early as yesterday, bands of armed men were 
seen roaming through the streets of the capital, calling for an uprising against the current 
government and all Western nations.  Then, without warning, the city seemed to explode 
this morning as militia groups began cruising through the city destroying American, 
British, and French business offices and shooting at suspected foreigners. However, the 
most dramatic event occurred hours ago as armed groups attempted to storm the US 
embassy and take hostages.  In fact, it appears that they were initially successful as a 
small group of US and foreign diplomats was captured at the outset. A US marine unit 
was dispatched to rescue the Americans and was able to do so only after a fierce gun 
battle with armed Manovans. However, several other Americans and foreigners were not 
rescued and were executed by Manovan crowds. Afterward, their bodies were dragged 
through the streets by cheering Manovans. At the moment the State Department has no 
comment on this situation. 
 
A control condition was included wherein which subjects received neither a 
written or audio/visual story, but instead skipped directly to the information series.  As 
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reported in the previous section, these manipulations were pre-tested and shown to be 
effective (p. 63). 
The Valence of the Information 
Following the emotional/affective manipulation, subjects were informed that, 
“As a context in which to gain better insight into what is happening in Manova, you can 
now view additional information about Manova gathered from news and governmental 
sources.” Subjects were randomly assigned to review one of three possible information 
sets, a positive, negative, or mixed set of information.  Each set consisted of 22 items of 
information. The positive set consisted of 18 positive and 4 negative items of 
information. Items were considered positive if they suggested that Manova or Manovans 
were similar to the US or sympathetic to US interests. Examples included, “Recently 
unclassified US intelligence documents indicate that the Manovan diplomatic corps 
helped US agents during times of peak Cold War hostilities,” and "Manova has long 
stood in support of the US role in the Organization of South Aegean States and has 
regularly voted in support of US interests in the region."  The negative set consisted of 
18 negative and 4 positive items of information. Items were considered positive if they 
suggested that Manova or Manovans were dissimilar to the US or antagonistic to US 
interests. Examples included, "In recent years, the Manovan military has been accused 
by opposition and Western human rights agencies of corruption and brutality against its 
citizens," and "The Manovan government has recently, and without explanation, 
expelled all foreign western missionaries and has seized all of their property and 
belongings, giving the westerners only 24 hours to leave the country or face detention 
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and arrest." The mixed set consisted of 11 positive and 11 negative items of information. 
A pretest of the effectiveness of the valence manipulation has also been previously 
reported (p. 63).  
Procedure 
Subjects were seated at individual computer terminals in the computer lab of the 
political science department and were instructed in the use of the computer application 
before being asked to begin reviewing information.  In accordance with our goal of 
testing hypotheses related to the processing of information, subjects were informed at the 
start of the experiment that their task was to make a decision about what the United 
States should do in Manova. In this scenario, the alternatives were presented as either 
pursuing negotiations with the Manovans to secure the release of hostages or use US 
military force to secure the hostages’ release. The computerized software guided 
subjects through each section of the experiment. Following the affective/emotional 
manipulation, subjects were presented with the additional information as described 
above. The program allowed subjects to review an item of information and then, by 
clicking on the button labeled “next item,” review a new item. However, contrary to the 
first experiment, subjects were not required to review all items of information  and could 
make a decision at anytime after the first item of information. Decisions were made by 
clicking on the button labeled “use force” or “negotiate.” Making a decision resulted in 
the subjects moving immediately to the final section of the experiment wherein which 
dependent variable measures were introduced. Upon completion of the experiment, all 
subjects were debriefed about the theoretical and empirical context of the experiment. 
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RESULTS 
 
The impetus of this experiment is to both illustrate the effects of emotion on 
political choice and differentiate between affective and emotive influences on 
information processing within the context of an international crisis. The findings 
reported in this regard address the effects of affect and emotion on processing 
parameters.   
 
Process Parameters 
Choice   
Choice results confirm the model’s expectation that the presence of emotional 
stimuli outweighs the effect of informational valence. In this  case we find that 
regardless of the effect of positive or negative information about the target actor, 
subjects in the emotional condition were far more likely to choose force than any other 
option (M=.639), [F(4,92)=8.65 p <.001].  Subjects in the affective condition were 
almost as likely to choose the use of force as they were to choose negotiation (M=.483), 
while subjects in the control condition invariably suggested negotiation over force 
(M=.205). The valence of the information about the target actor had no effect on 
subjects’ decision for force or negotiation. Figure 7 displays the results of the 
emotional/affective manipulation on choice. While these results are unsurprising, they 
confirm the initial suggestion that emotional content provides a powerful influence on 
information processing. The question remains, however, as to whether or not the 
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suggested thematic effect on content and capacity underlies this choice mechanism. 
 
Figure 7. Proportion Choosing Force as a Function of Experimental Condition 
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Number of Items Accessed 
Because subjects were allowed to make a policy choice at any time, and were not 
required to view all the items of information, a main effect of emotive state was 
expected. However the results did not conform to that expectation. Instead the results 
suggest an interaction of the emotional and informational manipulations. In the mixed 
information set, in which subjects have access to an equal number of positive and 
negative pieces of information about the target state, the emotion condition (video clip) 
resulted in fewer items accessed (M=17.25), as compared to the affective condition 
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(written story) (M=21), and the control condition (M=20.9), [F(4,92)=2.80 p <.05]. 
Figure 8 depicts these results.  
 
Figure 8. Number of Items Accessed as a Function of Experimental Condition 
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Within the positive information set subjects who received the emotional manipulation 
looked at slightly more items of information than all others. In this condition, where the 
resulting information runs contrary to the emotional state of the individual, more 
information is required in order to make sense of the ongoing events. Regardless, it is 
entirely possible for subjects to review any number of items of information without 
actually incorporating those items into any decisional process. Thus it becomes 
important to take time into consideration. 
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Dedicated Attention: Total Time 
On average, subjects spent 2.3 minutes (139 seconds) reviewing items of 
information. The average amount of time subjects spent on each item of information was 
7.3 seconds. In terms of differences between experimental groups, the 3 x 3 ANOVA 
yielded the following results. First, we found a statistically significant two-way 
interaction of emotive state and type of information processed on total time 
[F(4,92)=4.45 p<.05]. In this case, the emotion condition (video clip) generated the 
slowest processing time (M=165.03 sec) when processing the positive information than 
did the affective treatment (M=118.29 sec), and the control conditions (M=110.7). Here 
we see a continuation of the trend where subjects who have been subjected to the 
emotional stimulus struggle to make sense of an overwhelmingly positive list of 
information about the target state. Contrasted with the mixed and negative information 
set conditions, where subjects who viewed the emotional stimulus spent the least amount 
of time viewing additional information about the target state, the results suggest that 
subjects who face information which is compatible with a pre-existing emotional state 
tend to rely more on how they feel about the situation than they do on the information 
itself. This trend is compatible with our expectations. The pattern of the interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9. Processing Time as a Function of Experimental Condition 
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Unforewarned Free Recall 
Unforewarned free recall was used as an indirect measure of how much attention 
subjects paid to the information they have seen. Merely accessing information does not 
indicate that this information has some effect on decision making processes (Geva et al. 
2000).  As noted previously, the introduction of anger or hatred into the decisional 
process is hypothesized to restrict the amount of available attention subjects are able to 
focus on relevant details. The result should be an effect in which emotionally congruent 
information (i.e. negative) is recalled at a higher rate than positive information. 
Overall, recall was not high (about 6 of 22 items) and was not significant at 
p<.05. Generally, both the control (M=6.3) and negative emotion conditions (M=6.4) led 
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to slightly more recall than did the negative affect condition (M=5.8). We find a 
similarly non-significant trend looking at the information set, where the subjects in 
mixed and negative information conditions recalled slightly more information than did 
subjects in the positive information condition. 
Turning to a different analysis of recall, we examined whether the emotive states 
influenced differently the retrieval of positive versus negative items from the 
information sets. Since each of the three sets contained a different distribution of 
positive and negative items, the proportion of accurate recall of positive and negative 
items was analyzed in relation to their number in a specific set. Thus, as in the previous 
experiment, the proportion of recall of a particular valence of items served as the 
repeated measure in a 3 x 3 x 2 ANOVA. 
The first significant finding in this analysis is the main-effect of the valence of 
items sub-category. The participants recalled a higher proportion of negative items 
(M=.44) than positive items (M=.28), F(1,92)=17.12 p<.0001. The second finding 
pertains to the interaction of the emotion/affective manipulation with the items’ sub-
category (positive vs. negative), [F(2,92)=27.118 p<.0001]. Figure 10 illustrates the 
pattern.   
 101 
Figure 10. Proportion of Items Recalled as a Function of Emotional/Affective 
Manipulation. 
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Within both the control and affective (i.e. written) conditions we see a similar 
pattern of recall. In both cases the proportions are relatively similar, with a slightly 
higher rate of recall of positive information. Contrary to results from the first experiment 
where the ‘emotional’ subject paid less attention to “confirming” negative information 
than did ‘affective’ subjects, here we see a striking increase in the rate of recall of 
negative information. Contrasted with the lowest rate of recall for positive information 
among the three conditions, this significant finding corresponds with the hypothesis 
suggesting a dramatic step in processing behavior as a function of emotional context. 
Here we see strong evidence to support the claim that emotions introduce a thematic bias 
in information processing, both in terms of content (negative information) and capacity. 
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The results also show a significant three-way interaction between the emotive 
state, the information set, and the specific category of recall [F(4,91)=3.75 p<.01].  
Figure 11 presents a chart of this interaction. 
  
Figure 11. Proportion of Items Recalled as a Function of Information Valence and 
Emotional/Affective Manipulation 
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As found in the previous experiment, when the information set is mixed (and thus 
cognitively more demanding) only participants in a negative emotional state express a 
confirming thematic bias and tend to recall a higher proportion of negative than positive 
items.  Again, we do not find a similar thematic bias for control and the affect induced 
participants. This thematic bias is specifically hypothesized in the model.  
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While the rate of recall of negative information was highest across all conditions 
for subjects exposed to the emotional video clip, among these same subjects that rate of 
recall of negative information is actually lowest for those subjects in the negative 
information condition. Subjects who saw the video clip (and thus began the information 
processing task in an emotional state) and who were then presented with a relatively 
consistent stream of negative information actually recalled a smaller proportion of 
negative items than did subjects who saw a stream of relatively positive information or 
even mixed information. We interpret this to suggest that subjects in the emotional 
condition, upon exposure to a set of negative information, pay less attention to such 
confirmatory information, but instead a struck by disconfirming information. This effect 
is evidenced in the fact that the same subjects in the negative information condition 
recalled a slightly higher amount of positive information than did subjects in the positive 
or mixed information conditions.  
A further finding supports the distinction made here between affect and emotion 
and the suggestion that subjects in an evaluative/affective mode use information 
differently than do subjects who are experiencing negative emotions of anger or hate. 
For subjects within the affective (i.e. written) conditions of positive or negative 
information, we find a higher rate of recall of disconfirming information than 
confirming. Thus, subjects in the affective conditions who were presented with positive 
information tended to recall a higher rate of negative information, whereas ‘affective’ 
subjects presented with negative information tended to recall a higher rate of positive 
information. This would support the claim that disconfirming information is used to 
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update an affective state, thus leading to a higher rate of recall of such inconsistent data. 
Contrast this finding with ‘emotional’ subjects who are faced with information that is 
overwhelmingly inconsistent with their feeling state (positive information) or generally 
inconsistent and more cognitively demanding (mixed information set). For such 
students, attention to and recall of negative information served to reinforce an existing 
emotional state, thus their higher rates of overall recall. 
 
 DISCUSSION 
As noted previously, the purpose of this research program is to investigate our 
claim that 1) emotions are important process variables within the context of a foreign 
policy problem and 2) that emotions have a different status and different effects from 
affect.  The findings reported here suggest that these claims hold some merit. 
Furthermore, the findings of emotional effects within the context of a foreign policy 
choice problem confirm several hypotheses derived from the LoTES model. First, the 
overall effect of emotional content on foreign policy decision making is to introduce a 
thematic effect on the content and capacity of information used to arrive at a choice or 
decision.  Generalizing from our theory to the political arena, it becomes more evident 
that the emotional content of political problems may be far stronger force within the 
public sphere than has been previously recognized.  Feelings related to specific foreign 
policy actors and issues provide critical information pieces to individuals seeking to 
either make some sense out of a particular foreign policy issue, or to decide what he or 
she “thinks” about the problem. Given the general claims of this theory of emotions in 
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foreign policy, emotional problems in fact become far more intractable and inflexible 
than might have ever been previously suggested. Whereas affective evaluations of some 
significant political stimulus may be amenable to updating and change over time as new 
information arises, the ability of individuals to do so in the face of emotions of anger or 
hate seems remote at best.   
Overall our findings here are supportive of our hypotheses relating a difference 
in information processing as a function of emotive state. Choice was strongly influenced 
by the emotion manipulation. Subjects in the emotional condition were far more likely to 
choose force than any other option. On the other hand, the valence of the information 
about the target actor had no effect on subjects’ decisions for force or negotiation. The 
amount of attention paid to the information as measured by recall was also supportive of 
our hypotheses and in general confirmed the results of the previous experiment in which 
only participants in a negative emotional state expressed a confirming thematic bias and 
tended to recall a higher proportion of negative than positive items.  As was the case in 
the previous experiment, we do not find a similar thematic bias for control and the affect 
induced participants. 
On the other hand some findings here are not as supporting. Despite the fact that 
we expected a main effect of emotion on the number of items subjects would access, the 
results reported here showed otherwise. Contrary to the previous experiment in which 
mixed information resulted in more time spent trying to “make sense” of the inconsistent 
set, here we found that the interaction between the emotion condition and the mixed set 
of information resulted in fewer items of information being accessed than either the 
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affective or control conditions. Additionally, we must ask why subjects in the emotion 
condition spent more time viewing positive information but very little time viewing 
negative information. Both of these results are equally difficult to interpret in light of the 
specific hypotheses which suggest that the mixed or incongruous set should lead to more 
information being accessed, and that the emotion condition should result in a similar 
amount of time spent viewing both positive and negative information.  
One possible explanation may be the context of the experiment. In this case, 
subjects were required to not only make sense of information, but also to use that 
information for a specific policy choice, i.e. what they believed should be done. The 
choice requirement may have resulted in an additional emphasis on positive, or explicitly 
inconsistent, information. Thus, information of a mixed nature was processed in a 
similar fashion as information of a negative—or consistent—nature. In both cases, it 
may be that such information was dealt with swiftly in order to facilitate choice. On the 
other hand, the choice requirement may have made more salient the effect of positive 
information thus resulting in additional time spent viewing such information by the 
subjects in question. This remains a rather puzzling finding, particularly in light of the 
fact that a similar finding was not reproduced in the earlier experiment. Additional 
research in this regard will necessitate addressing the differential effects of emotional 
state depending upon the task (interpretation versus choice) as well as the influence of 
positive and inconsistent information within that task. 
It should be noted, however, that the findings reported here are generally in 
agreement with those reported by Marcus and colleagues, that negative emotions 
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increase vigilance to negative information. The findings of this experiment correspond 
more to those of Marcus and colleagues than the findings of the previous experiment. 
However we find in our experiment that the use of information used by such subjects is 
mediated by the cognitive effort demanded of them in making sense of some problem en 
route to a choice. The more cognitively demanding, or emotionally incongruent, the 
information, the more an effect was found on information processing. 
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CASE STUDY 
 
The experimental findings reported thus far suggest that a negative emotional 
state may color perceptions of international events by influencing the manner in which 
information relevant to foreign policy is perceived and interpreted. Furthermore, the 
findings suggest that negative emotions influence the processing of information pursuant 
to a foreign policy choice. However, an important question to ask at this point relates to 
how the abstractions of emotion and affect work in the real political world, outside the 
realm of the laboratory. If we are to establish the case that emotions are an important 
component of the foreign policy decision making calculus, then it is certainly necessary 
to investigate whether or not this model can be illustrated within the context of foreign 
policy events.  
By looking at case histories of emotion-evoking foreign policy events, we are 
able to shed further light on the influence of emotion in international relations. If 
carefully selected and evaluated with precision, case comparisons should allow us to 
ascertain whether the hypotheses tested and confirmed within the previously discussed 
experiments might be analogous to real world responses of individuals (c.f. George 
1979). The model presented here suggests that emotion and affect have differential 
effects on the interpretation of foreign policy events and the processing of information 
about those events.  Thus, in order to select cases for this form of analysis, it becomes 
necessary to choose an incident or incidents of which the public has had to interpret, or 
makes sense of, foreign policy information. Furthermore, in order to evaluate the 
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strength or weaknesses of the model presented here, one case or incident should be 
characterized by negative emotions whereas the comparison case should be 
characterized by negative affect. In this approach, selection of appropriate cases on the 
basis of the dependent variable, an approach similar to that found in comparative 
political analysis (Lijphart 1971, 1975; Meckstroth 1975; Przeworski and Teune 1970). 
Two cases which fit these requirements are the first World Trade Center 
bombing of February 1993, and the second attack on the World Trade Center in 
September of 2001. It is assumed from the outset that the first attack generated negative 
affect within a large segment of the US population, whereas the second attack generated 
negative emotion. From this basis it is possible to compare the two cases by looking 
closely at differences in how the general public made sense of and responded to these 
events. The benefit underlying this methodology lies in the fact that responses to these 
two cases, rather than being artificially invoked by the research in an experimental 
setting, were spontaneously generated from the perception of the two incidents in 
question.  A comparison of responses to the first World Trade Center bombing and the 
second attack on the WTC provides ‘real life’ insight and evidence of the effects 
emotions will and do have on public perceptions of international events.  
It has been suggested so far that emotions influence the interpretation and 
processing of foreign policy information by restricting the content and capacity of the 
type of information used in such instances. This influence of emotion on the thematic 
nature of information used to make sense of foreign policy, and on the amount of 
information used, should be evident by analyzing the type of statements made at the 
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public level about these two important foreign policy events. Similar approaches to 
gleaning the beliefs of individuals from written statements have been used by Margaret 
Hermann and colleagues. Hermann’s analysis of political leader’s traits proceeds under 
the assumption that the frequency with which leaders use certain words and phrases 
connotes an underlying saliency to the concepts employed (1976, 1977). While 
Hermann’s study focuses on assessing underlying characteristics which influence the 
governing behavior of political leaders, the methodology employed seems particularly 
relevant to our assessment of public attitudes towards international events.  
In the same way that leaders’ orientations toward the world, themselves, and 
other nations can be discerned from public statements, so to should we be able to tap into 
similar orientations of public individuals through their writings published in newspapers. 
Similar uses of content analysis have been used by Walker and colleagues to map the 
operational codes of leaders (Walker 1977, 1983; Walker et al. 1998, 1999). Coding of 
such materials implies an “assessment-at-a-distance” in order to ascertain general 
patterns of thought individuals hold toward the world and their role within it (Scully and 
Kille 1998). In this case, such assessment focuses on uncovering underlying orientations 
held by individuals towards not only those responsible for two separate NY attacks, but 
also towards their own in-group. 
Regional newspapers are a source of information about how the public has 
responded to a foreign policy event. Editorials and published letters to newspapers 
provide insight into how the public is making sense of or interpreting ongoing political 
affairs. Within editorials and the published letters of private citizens, it should be 
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possible to clearly ascertain differences in language used to describe personal feelings 
towards either WTC1 or 9/11 as well as differentiation in the cognitive complexity of 
statements made about these foreign policy events. While this source of information will 
not provide us with an ideal or pure picture of the influence of emotions on the 
interpretation and processing of foreign policy information, it should nonetheless give 
further insight into the real world workings of what we have discovered thus far in the 
previous experiments. 
At this point it may be important to introduce within this analysis an additional 
variable which may have an interactive effect on the dependent variable. It is possible 
that geographic distance from the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001 
may have mediated the presence or absence of the emotional state and thus produced an 
interactive effect on the dependent variables of cognitive complexity and 
inferential/interpretive statements (discussed below). The addition of this variable allows 
for the possibility that individuals close to the attacks within both time periods may have 
perceived information about the events as more salient than those who lived at a further 
distance. Thus, individuals living close to New York may have been more likely to 
perceive a threatening situation and thus made more inferential statements about the 
intentions of the perpetrators of both attacks.  
Based upon the propositions about emotions and foreign policy as discussed in 
an earlier section, it is suggested that the following differences should be apparent when 
analyzing these two cases: 
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A. Inferential or interpretive statements 
Vertzberger (1990:326-327) notes that “...knowledge that is embedded in 
traumatic historical events, that contains a strong affective element, and that becomes a 
source of central beliefs is immensely difficult to refute or falsify.  It encourages a 
continuing search for validating evidence [emphasis mine] and has stereotypic effects 
with regard to the expected behavior of other actors.” Because emotions influence the 
amount of information used to make sense of an event, and the type of information used, 
differences in expressions describing the perpetrators of an event, or the victims 
themselves, should be apparent between the two cases. Negative emotion should be 
evident in an increase in the use of and reliance on schematic/thematic images of the 
perpetrators and the victims such as “good v. evil.” Individuals experiencing an 
emotional response to a foreign policy event should be more likely to resort to an enemy 
stereotype to categorize the attackers while describing their own country in idealistic and 
moral terms.  
B. Cognitive Complexity 
Because emotions restrict the amount of information used to make sense of a 
foreign policy event, differentiation of expression should be apparent between the two 
cases. Negative emotion should be evident in a decrease in degree of differentiation and 
integration of information about foreign policy and the stimulus event. A decrease in 
cognitive complexity should be evident in statements related to the 9/11 case, but not the 
WTC1 case. 
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METHOD 
Sources 
25 regional newspapers selected from a pool of newspapers which are indexed in 
full text via LexisNexis Academic and Library Solutions. LexisNexis is a publisher of 
research and reference publications available via the internet and provides full text 
archival coverage of numerous magazines, newspapers, wire transcripts, radio 
broadcasts and journals. The twenty-five newspapers were selected on the basis of their 
geographical distribution. Table 4 displays the names of the newspapers and the regions 
to which they belong.  All 25 newspapers were covered in full text, including editorials 
and letters to the editor, by LexisNexis for the time periods in question 
 
Time Period and Scope 
The first World Trade Center bombing (WTC1) occurred on February 26, 1993. 
All editorials and letters to the editor from February 26, 1993 to March 3, 1993 (one 
week) for which WTC1 was the primary topic were analyzed across the categories 
mentioned above. The second World Trade Center attack (9/11) occurred on September 
11, 2001. Similarly, all editorials and letters to the editor from September 11, 2001 to 
September 17, 2001 (one week) were analyzed. The breakdown of letters and editorials 
by time frame follows: 
WTC1 Letters (total count): 15 9/11 Letters (total count): 122 
WTC2 Editorials (total count): 33 9/11 Editorials (total count): 64 
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Table 4. Newspaper Sources  
 
Midwest newspapers: 
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
The Plain Dealer 
Columbus Dispatch 
 
Northeast newspapers: 
Buffalo News 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
Post-Standard (Syracuse, NY) 
Union Leader (NH) 
 
Southeast newspapers: 
Augusta Chronicle 
Miami Herald 
Miami New Times 
News & Record (Greensboro, NC) 
Palm Beach Post 
Roanoke Times and World News 
St. Petersburg Times 
The Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA)  
 
Western newspapers: 
Denver Post 
Houston Chronicle 
Idaho Falls Post Register 
Lewiston Morning Tribune 
Modesto Bee 
Phoenix New Times 
San Francisco Chronicle 
Seattle Times 
 
Categories of Analysis 
Inferential or Interpretive Statements 
Each letter and editorial was analyzed for evidence of thematic or stereotypic 
evaluation consistent with the effect produced by the presence of negative emotions. 
Individuals experiencing hate or anger should rely more heavily on the use of such 
schematic generalizations in order to describe either the perpetrators of the attacks or the 
victims (i.e. the United States). For example, the statements “only Palestinian terrorists 
kill like this” or “these people only know violence” would be evidence of out-group 
inferences brought on by a negative emotional state. Similarly, a statement like, “the 
cowards can blow up our buildings and kill our babies, but the American spirit lives on” 
would be evidence of a thematic inference about the in-group (America) resulting from a 
negative emotional state.  
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As noted above, the approach taken here follows the design logic suggested in 
Hermann’s (1977, 1980, 1984; Callahan et al. 1982) analysis of leadership styles in 
attempting to determine the general orientation of elites towards their own group or 
towards an out-group. Coding procedures for Hermann’s approach rely on the unit of 
analysis as the word or phrase referring to the event/in-group/out-group. The key to this 
coding procedure is to ascertain when the modifiers used towards an in-group or out-
group are favorable or unfavorable in orientation. Each letter and editorial was coded 
separately for the presence of either an in-group inference (1-0) or an out-group 
inference (1-0). An obviously important question concerns the coding procedure by 
which this determination was made. 
Coding Procedure:  
A total of 24 base adjectives were used to indicate the presence of an in-group or 
out-group inference. 12 of these adjectives were explicitly indicative of an in-group 
inference, and 12 were presumed to be indicative of an out-group inference. Of critical 
importance was the clear indication that favorable modifiers were in reference to the 
submitter’s in-group by use of such direct object phrases as “we are,” “Americans are,” 
or “our nation is.” Favorable modifiers included terms such as “peace-loving,” 
“capable,” “strong,” “united,” “brave,” and “great,” to name but a few.  Unfavorable 
modifiers towards an out-group were prefaced by direct object phrases referencing some 
out-group entity such as “they are,” “the people that did this,” “those people,” and “our 
enemies are.” Unfavorable modifiers include terms such as “evil,” “lawless,” 
“cowardly,” “warlike,” “hostile,” and “aggressive.”   
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Table 5. In-Group and Out-Group Inferences 
 
In-group Inference Out-group Inference 
Peaceful Aggressive/hostile 
Trusting Deceitful 
Truthful Fanatical 
Honest Lawless 
Good Evil/bad 
Friendly Murderous 
United Corrupt 
Brave Cowardly 
Ally Enemy 
Strong/capable Weak 
Determined/resolute Prejudiced/bigoted 
Superior/best Arrogant 
 
Table 5 contains the complete listing of terms used to identify an orientation 
toward an in- or out-group from respondents.  
Each item containing a reference to either the first or second World Trade Center 
attack was read to determine the presence of 1) a word from lists above and 2) the 
connection of the modifier to a term indicating reference to either the commentator’s in-
group or to another, external group. The presence of both the modifier (e.g. “bad”) and 
the object term/phrase (“they”) was required to indicate the presence of an inference. 
Thus, a general statement about “friendly nations,” or “bigoted people” would not have 
been noted as an inference given the lack of a direct object term such as “we are,” or 
“they have been.”  
In such cases where a term was discovered which, while not a part of the list, 
might have lent itself to inclusion therein given its similarity in meaning, the term was 
checked against Roget’s Thesaurus online.12  If the questionable term was shown as have 
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synonymous properties to the main term (e.g. “foul” is listed in the thesaurus as 
synonymous with “evil”), then the term was considered as belonging to the category of 
“unfavorable out-group reference.”  
Cognitive Complexity 
A brief discussion of cognitive/integrative complexity as it relates to the model 
of emotion is warranted here. Cognitive or integrative complexity theory (Suedfeld and 
Tetlock 1977; Suedfeld et al. 1992; Suedfeld and Bluck 1988; Baker-Brown et al. 1992) 
focuses on differentiation of information processing and decision making at the 
individual level. Differentiation refers to the extent to which individuals perceive 
different dimensions within a stimulus and to whether different perspectives are taken 
into consideration which evaluating a stimulus domain (Suedfeld et al. 1992). Integration 
refers to the ability of the individual to make conceptual connections between 
differentiated dimensions of a cognitive stimulus (Baker-Brown et al. 1992). Cognitive 
complexity is then defined as “the degree of differentiation and integration in the 
cognitive processing of relevant arguments, positions and viewpoints” (Suedfeld and 
Bluck 1988:628). Because the model of emotion and foreign policy information 
processing put forth here suggests a restriction on cognitions in the presence of an 
emotional stimulus, it holds that individuals experiencing negative emotions should 
exhibit a decrease in integrative complexity. Conversely, individuals experiencing 
negative affect should not exhibit a similar decrease in integrative complexity. 
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Coding Procedure:  
The procedure used to score the material is based on that recommended in the 
Coding Manual for Conceptual/Integrative Complexity by Baker-Brown et al. (1992). 
This procedure involves selecting a single paragraph consisting of at least two sentences. 
Uncodable texts include paragraphs consisting of simple clichés, satire and sarcasm, 
quotations and definitions. The coding of archival materials using the integrative 
complexity approach has typically been scored on a 1 to 7 scale (Suedfeld et al. 1992; 
Suedfeld and Bluck 1988; Baker-Brown et al. 1992). Scores of 1 indicate no evidence of 
differentiation or integration, whereas scores of 7 indicate a high degree of 
differentiation and integration (Suedfeld and Bluck 1988; Baker-Brown et al. 1992).  
 Coding of each paragraph was relatively straightforward using indicators and 
examples provided in Baker-Brown et al. (1992). 
Score of 1: Writer rejects alternative perspectives on an issue—only one way of looking 
at the world is legitimate  
Score of 2: Writer recognizes possibility of alternative views but alternative perspectives 
are not developed (evidence of differentiation) 
Score of 3: Clear specification of at least two different ways of dealing with the same 
information. Differentiation of two separable perspectives is a key criterion. 
Score of 4: Requirements of 3 plus recognition of a relationship or dynamic between the 
two perspectives that could interact (evidence of integration) 
Score of 5: Clear expression that multiple alternatives are not only held simultaneously 
but are also viewed interactively. Integration of two separable perspectives is a 
key criterion. 
Score of 6. Specific expression about the mechanism behind the interaction in 5. The 
dynamics behind the interaction of multiple points of view. 
Score of 7. Alternative perspectives are presented within the context of a larger 
viewpoint and multiple-level interaction is distinguished. 
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Baker-Brown et al. suggest a number of “content flags” which clue analysts in to the 
general score region for each piece. For example, the presence of a single viewpoint in 
conjunction with the use of terms such as always, never, forever, absolutely, constantly, 
or unquestionably indicates a strong possibility of a score of 1. The presence of at least 
two viewpoints and use of terms such as alternatively, either-or, and “on the other hand” 
indicate a possible 3.  
 A paragraph from each letter or editorial was randomly selected and evaluated 
using the criteria suggested in Coding Manual for Conceptual/Integrative Complexity. 
Each paragraph was first checked for the presence of content flags as suggested by 
Baker-Brown et al. (ibid) and then checked for the expression of primary perspective or 
statement.  Scores were assigned based on the guidelines noted above. It should be noted 
that a large proportion of letters from either the first or second World Trade Center 
incidents consisted of very short paragraphs of no more than three or four sentences in 
length. Obviously, given the coding criteria and the explicit need to identify a primary 
perspective on an issue or the expression of an alternative or dimension, short or 
shortened paragraphs will result in lower scores than might be found in editorials. As 
will be noted below, it is highly possible that the editing process as applied to letters to 
the editor resulted in a uniform or biased sample and thus influenced the analysis of 
cognitive complexity. 
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RESULTS 
The basic premise underlying the analysis implies that negative emotions (hate 
and anger) lowers the processing threshold more than an affective state, and that this 
effect will be discernable in public forums such as letters to the editor and editorials in 
newspapers. In order to verify that the two attacks produced the independent variable 
states required in order to test for the “real world” effects of negative emotion/negative 
affect on interpretation of foreign policy events, a simple manipulation check was 
performed. This check focused on the use of negative emotional language present in the 
letters and editorials of the newspapers during the time frames in question. 
 
Manipulation Check 
 Negative emotion should be evident in the use of strong emotionally charged 
language suggesting “hate,” “anger,” “fear,” “rage,” and “disgust.”  We would expect to 
find a great degree of such language in the 9/11 case, but not in the WTC1 case. Each 
letter and editorial was analyzed for use of emotional language. It is important to note 
that this measure differs significantly from the inferential/interpretive measure of the 
dependent variable in that the check for negative emotional language reflects the writer’s 
personal reflection of his/her emotional state. Self-evaluative terms as “angry,” 
“horrified,” “disgusted,” “sickened,” and “mad” were noted.  When appropriate, phrases 
which point to such emotions were also taken into consideration. For example the 
statement, “For God’s sake, the Pentagon!” would be indicative of shock or horror. “I’m 
seeing red and I want to throw up” would be indicative of anger or disgust. Each letter 
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and editorial was coded as 1 for the presence of emotional language or 0 for the absence 
of emotional language.  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA of the data coded from regional newspapers yielded the 
following results. First, strong evidence supports the claim that there were differences 
between the first World Trade Center bombing and 9/11 in terms of the emotion 
expressed at the public level. More emotional content was discernable in letters and 
editorials following September 11th (M=.317) than following the first World Trade 
Center bombing (M=.064) [F(1,229)=7.55 p<.05]. As would be expected, the use of 
emotionally-laded language was far more evident within the context of public letters to 
newspaper editors (M=.409) than was found within editorials themselves (M= .063) 
[F(1,229)=7.88 p<.05]. Finally, the interaction between these two conditions clearly 
suggests that there were substantial differences in public responses to these two events, 
as shown in Figure 12.  Following 9/11, almost half of the letters published in the 
selected newspapers expressed negative emotions (M=.451) [F(1,229)=7.55 p<.05]. 
Contrasted with the frequency of negative emotional content in editorials following 9/11, 
and in both editorials and letters to the editor following the first World Trade Center 
bombing in 1993, all of which were close to 6 percent, the difference is dramatic. 
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Figure 12. Frequency of the Use of Negative Emotional Language 
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Many of the post-9/11 letters expressed both shock an anger at the attack on the 
World Trade Center. Some stated their feelings clearly: “I suspect I’ll be [thinking about 
the World Trade Center attack] for a long time, because I am very angry” (Keith E. 
Gatling, September 16, 2001 The Post-Standard, Syracuse, NY). Several letters 
expressed not only anger and shock, but associated physical responses to learning of the 
events of September 11th. One citizen wrote, “Physically I was ill. I was shaking 
uncontrollably. My head hurt. I was sick to my stomach” (Vickie Cook, September 12, 
2001 News and Record, Greensboro, NC).  
Remarkably, the type of language used within editorials following 9/11 was often 
similar in tone and content to editorials and letters following the first World Trade 
Center bombing. Following the first World Trade Center attack in spring of 1993, many 
individuals expressed concerned sentiments of a practical nature, primarily revolving 
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around the question of national domestic security. One letter writer noted that, “after the 
recent incident at the World Trade Center, we should be thinking of ways to protect the 
people” (Julia Kridelbaugh, March 9, 1993, St. Louis Post-Dispatch). This concern was 
echoed as well in several editorials, for example that of the St. Petersburg Times on 
March 2, 1993, where it was suggested that, “The terrorist attack on the twin towers . . . 
should spur a national reassessment of our ability to protect our people, our government 
operations and our major business enterprises from sophisticated political terrorists.” 
Editorial comments following September 11 could be generalized as pursing a 
similar, practical approach to understanding or making sense of the event. An editorial in 
the Palm Beach Post (September 12, 2001) listed questions that America needed to 
answer such as, “How did the American intelligence network fail to detect a plot that 
might have been years in the making?”, “How did the hijackers commandeer four flights 
in one day?”, and whether the US should center its national defense strategy hopes on a 
nuclear missile shield. In fact, the general approach taken by most editorials following 
September 11 was not to participate in the emotional context of the event, but instead to 
ask questions relating to the event itself, primarily variants of, “how could this have 
happened?”, “what should be done now”, and “what does the nation do now?”  
These findings suggest that we have every reason to believe that the events of 
9/11 produced the desired independent variable state of negative emotion whereas the 
1993 WTC bombing did not have the same effect. It is of course not surprising that 
emotionally charged language would be present in public responses to 9/11. Certainly 
not only the attack itself but also the video images of planes flying into a symbolic 
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landmark only served to exponentially amplify emotional responses to the event. 
Numerous letters within the sample expressed the sentiment that they had witnessed an 
event which would change their lives forever. 
 
Analysis of the Dependent Variables 
Inferential or Interpretive Statements 
The proportion of editorials and letters consisting of in-group/out-group 
inferences was analyzed. Thus, the proportion of inferences in relation to their number in 
a specific set was analyzed. Thus, the proportion of inferences pertaining to a particular 
group served as the repeated measure in a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA. The analysis of in-group 
and out-group inferences found within the letters and editorials following the two World 
Trade Center attacks showed only a weakly significant difference between the frequency 
of in-group inferences found in editorials (M=.031) and those found in letters (M=.066) 
[F(1,229)=3.48 p<.10]. No significant difference was present between the first and 
second World Trade Center attack for in-group and out-group inferences. These data 
notwithstanding, it should be noted that there were very few explicit examples on the 
reliance of negative schemas or stereotypes in descriptions of the perpetrators of 
September 11.  
One letter writer wondered how it was possible that “they call us infidels, these 
enemies who can yell, “Praise Allah,” as they raise their blood-drenched hands to strike 
at innocent people” (Nelda Bromberg, September 15, 2001, Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette).  However, the most noticeable form of thematic interpretation concerned self-
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images or in-group inferences. The sentiment expressed by Eric Cromer in a letter to the 
St. Louis-Post Dispatch (September 17, 2001), “It is our reliance on truth that will carry 
us to victory over the evil that has struck,” and of another editorial in The Seattle Times 
(September 12, 2001) which stated “America, the world will learn again, is a good friend 
and a bad enemy” point to the inclination of people to seek common identity and 
reassure each other in times of crisis that they are strong, a dynamic underlying 
diversionary theories of war (Gelpi 1997; Levy 1989; Morgan and Bickers 1992) and the 
“rally-round the flag” effect (Baum 2002; Baker and Oneal 2001). Overall, while a 
surface review of letters and editorials suggested a tendency for individuals to make 
inferences about the strength, unity and resolve of the in-group (i.e. America) following 
the September 11 attacks, the effect was not pronounced enough to produce significant 
findings. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, there is a possibility that 
interpretation of the events in question were also mediated by distance. Thus, it would be 
expected that the closer individuals lived to New York, the more salient and threatening 
the events of 1993 and 2001 would have been perceived. The result would be an 
interaction between geographic distance to New York and the affect-producing event 
(the first World Trade Center attack) and the emotion-producing event (9/11). In order to 
ascertain the potential for such an interaction, the newspapers from which editorials and 
letters were obtained were divided into those considered geographically “close” to New 
York, and those which were considered “far.” Newspapers considered to fall into the 
former category included any city within a day’s drive of New York, assigned to the 
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distance of 500 miles from the city. Thus, the newspapers considered to be fall into the 
“close” category included the following: 
Buffalo News (297 mi.) 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (318 mi.) 
Post-Standard-Syracuse, NY (199 mi.) 
Union Leader-Manchester, NH (205 mi.) 
The Plain Dealer-Cleveland, OH (408 mi.) 
Columbus Dispatch-Columbus, OH (480 mi.) 
News & Record-Greensboro, NC (450 mi.) 
Roanoke Times and World News-Roanoke, VA (399 mi.) 
 
Inclusion of the independent variable “Distance” into the analysis produced a single 
significant main effect between the repeated measure of in/out-group inferences and 
distance [F(1,225=4.63 p<.05]. Editorials and letters in newspapers close to New York 
tended to have more out-group inferences (M=.20) than those far from New York 
(M=.12). On the other hand, editorials and letters in newspapers far from New York 
tended to have make in-group inferences more frequently (M=.053) than those close to 
New York (M=.025). A possible interpretation of this finding is that it underscores the 
idea that the perception of threat, augmented by the salience of the threat, in this case as 
represented by geographic distance from the events in question. Individuals located in 
cities closer to the events of 1993 and 2001 felt more threatened by both events and thus 
were more likely to make inferences about out-groups felt to be responsible for the 
attacks. On their own, however, these findings as they relate to geography are 
inconclusive.  
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Cognitive Complexity 
An analysis of the degree of conceptual differentiation and integration present in 
letters and editorials following both attacks produced a strong effect for the source 
category i.e. letter or editorial, but no effects for the timing of the attack, or the 
interaction between letters and editorials written after the first World Trade Center attack 
or after 9/11. As expected, mean complexity scores for editorials were higher (M=1.56) 
than those for letters from the public (M=1.04) [F(1,229)=20.71 p<.001].  No effect of 
geographic distance was present in the analysis.  
However the samples did not suggest that the ability of individuals to integrate 
and differentiate between concepts, and make conceptual linkages, was influenced by the 
emotional context of the situation. Anecdotal evidence from within the sample suggests 
that individuals expressing negative emotions following the September 11th attacks were 
no less likely to make links between such conceptual areas as terrorism and US foreign 
policy, or Islam and fundamentalism, than individuals following the first World Trade 
Center attack. One explanation for this effect would be to suggest that it reinforces the 
findings of Marcus’ and colleagues (1988, 2000) that the presence of negative emotions 
actually increases vigilance and thereby might result in more, not less, differentiation 
and integration of relevant concepts. An alternative explanation might suggest that some 
systematic bias is represented within the sample of letters selected to be published, in 
that editors would tend to ignore letters of a more base and simple nature, opting instead 
to publish those deemed to be more thoughtful and insightful. Despite these initial 
findings, the model suggests a definite relationship between the presence of negative 
 128 
emotions and the integrative complexity of individuals, a relationship which should be 
further examined in the future. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this section was to compare two cases in order to provide “real-
life” evidence of that which has already been shown in the experimental laboratory; 
namely, that negative emotions influence how political observers interpret and make 
sense of information about important foreign policy events. By looking at public 
responses to the events of September 11th and comparing those responses to a similar 
attack on American soil, it was hoped that further light could be shed on how negative 
emotional reactions to these events results in thematic restrictions on the ability of 
individuals to and make sense of and respond to events of import. Furthermore, an 
intention of this section was to show that these negative emotional responses were 
different than affective responses associated with the first attack on the World Trade 
Center. 
An analysis of letters to the editor and editorial comments in the ten-day period 
following the first World Trade Center attack on February 26, 1993 and the ten-day 
period following the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center suggests that 
there were differences in the responses of individuals to these two events. The type of 
language used to express personal sentiments or reactions to 9/11 differed dramatically 
from that used to respond to the first World Trade Center attack. Not only were the 
differences in responses visible in the quantity of material available, but public letters to 
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newspapers were replete with expressions of shock, disgust, anger, horror, outrage, and 
disbelief. In comparison to the rather mild response to the first attack on the World 
Trade Center, the contrast is profound. Unfortunately, further hypotheses about the 
effect of these two events were not supported by analysis of the editorials and letters 
found in newspapers. While a reading of these materials provides examples of inferential 
statements about Arabs, terrorists, Americans, and pleas for retaliation, unity, and 
cohesion, a more detailed empirical analysis of these two incidents does not suggest a 
statistically significant difference in the use of such inferences between the cases.  
Likewise, a cursory review of letters responding to 9/11 and letters in response to the 
first World Trade Center attack would seem to suggest that the emotional response to the 
collapse of the Twin Towers constricted the ability of individuals to express more 
complex relationships between cognitive constructs, or integrate pre-existing cognitions 
with new information. Many of the paragraphs sampled for this analysis of cognitive 
complexity were quite blunt and simple, demanding action, asking why, wondering how, 
or expressing simple hope. However, as in the previous case, there was not found to be a 
empirically significant difference in cognitive complexity scorings for letters and 
editorials between these periods. 
As mentioned previously, it remains plausible that the written materials used to 
uncover evidence of the effect of negative emotions on the interpretation of the separate 
World Trade Center attacks were either not an adequate or appropriate source. It is not a 
difficult argument to make that editors pay special attention to all material published in 
their papers and are particularly sensitive, regardless of the context, to comments 
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perceived to be overtly inflammatory or provocative. Editors may have screened letters 
by refusing to publish certain ones which they deemed inappropriate due to emotional 
content, or they may have “cleaned” letters by rewording them in order to “tone down” 
the emotional content which our content analysis was purposed to uncover. Thus, it is 
quite possible that a hypothesis to be tested which arises from this case has to do with 
the extent to which the expression of negative emotions, at any level, is viewed as an 
abrogation of societal norms. This would suggest that expressing “inappropriate” anger 
or hatred in a public forum might be viewed as entirely too seditious an act, and would 
thus further enforce the belief that politicians only commit political suicide by conveying 
such emotions. 
 Despite these initial case study findings which did not fully meet expectations, 
the strength of differential responses to the two Twin Towers attacks does not in any 
way preclude the suggestion that the emotional processes which were clearly evident in 
previous experiences were somehow nonexistent in these incidents. On the contrary, the 
potent language used by individuals relating their emotional responses to 9/11 suggests 
that the underlying cognitive consequences of emotional response to foreign policy 
events may just simply be far more difficult to observe in the public context. We have 
every reason to believe that negative emotions profoundly shape the manner in which 
individuals make sense of and respond to the world, particularly in light of the growing 
awareness that state borders are no longer the barriers to hostility, anger and hatred that 
they might have once been perceived to be. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Herein has been documented an attempt to evaluate a theory which outlines 
several propositions about the relationship between emotions and foreign policy decision 
making. This theory has attempted to address  what is seen as a glaring omission in 
current and previous studies on how individuals evaluate information about international 
affairs, namely, that negative emotions such as anger and hatred can and do influence the 
manner in which people perceive, make sense of, and respond to information about 
foreign events.  
It is argued here that our responses to international relations are not just a 
function of the information at our disposal; emotions affect how information is 
integrated, our capacity to retain information, and what we retain or include in the 
process. In this latter case, we need to look at what emotions are doing along side of the 
cognitive process.  The assumption here is that there are consequences on processes and 
outcomes when emotions are involved, and that these consequences are different in such 
instances where emotions are not involved (i.e. when processes and choice are merely 
modeled as the result of cognitions). 
As has been noted, the extant literature on decision making within the context of 
foreign policy has tended to focus on either rational calculations derived from the 
objective characteristics of the components of international relations, or it has focused on 
the subjective perception of those same characteristics utilizing “cold” cognitions. 
Despite our intuitive understanding, and the findings of researchers in other disciplines, 
 132 
few have attempted to incorporate emotions into an empirical framework relating to 
foreign policy. 
Based on previous studies of emotion found in psychology and those few studies 
within the field of political science which have directly or indirectly addressed this issue, 
the theory posited herein has addressed negative emotions as an independent variable 
and attempted to ascertain, specifically, how such emotions influence 1) the 
interpretation of foreign policy information and 2) the processes by which individuals 
exposed to such information arrive at a decision.  
Two important caveats were set forth, from the outset, which bear repeating here. 
First, this study has addressed emotions as they influence public, not elite, perceptions of 
international relations. This restriction was put in place as a practical matter given the 
strength of two potential arguments against addressing emotions at the elite level. In the 
first case, it could be argued that politicians are hampered in their ability to display 
emotions by important cultural and political restrictions. Examples have been cited of 
elites who have displayed emotions publicly and suffered political consequences for 
such actions. It may be that voters are uncomfortable with the public display of emotions 
by their leaders, that the public holds elites to a higher standard of performance than they 
hold for themselves, and that for the most part, the public expects its leaders to deal with 
all problems and events in a cool, rational manner. Displays of emotion may raise 
questions in the minds of voters and constituents as to the competency for leadership 
held by such elites.  It is also possible that leaders use emotions to advance their own 
political agendas by arousing anxiety, anger, or fear among their constituencies. This 
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argument suggests that rather than being swayed by emotional currents, elites are more 
capable of using such feelings to their own political ends.  
Based upon these initial contentions, it was deemed from the outset to be a matter 
of expediency to focus on how emotions influence public perceptions of international 
relations in general. This approach does not suggest that elites are impervious to the very 
same effects of negative emotions which have been found herein, merely that the results 
reported here are considered to be generalizeable to the public, not elite sphere. As will 
be discussed towards the end of this section, future research will attempt to address the 
role of emotions on foreign policy leaders. 
Second, this study has focused on the role of negative emotions as independent 
variables. The sources of emotion are varied and multi-faceted. Interesting questions 
remain unanswered as to the relationship between enemy or ally images and emotion, 
situational factors and the rise of specific feelings, and whether emotions arise in 
response to events, the perception of actors, or some combination of both. Several 
assumptions have been required as to the nature of emotion in order to stimulate 
negative emotional responses from experimental participants. Fundamentally, those 
assumptions were based upon basic postulates of social identity theory suggesting that 
harmful or injurious actions of an out-group toward a member of one’s in-group result in 
negative feelings towards such antagonists. The manipulation of emotion using such a 
scenario presented in video and written form was checked prior to incorporation within 
the experiments. As was expected, the basic sources of negative emotion were 
successfully tapped and found to be present when subjects evaluated the experimental 
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materials. Beyond these assumptions about the nature of negative emotion, however, this 
study has been preoccupied not with the causes of emotion, but its effects. 
In the course of reviewing the voluminous literature about emotions and decision 
making, it became clear that there were, in essence, two separate approaches to the 
phenomenon. In the first, it appeared that emotions were often modeled as a form of 
evaluation or judgment. Such studies often tended to structure emotion as part of a larger 
attitudinal construct in concert with cognitions and behavioral inclinations. That affect is 
conceived of as an evaluative construct is evidence by the proposition within many of 
these theories that affect is a bi-dimensionally valenced phenomenon of like/dislike, 
love/hate, and happy/sad. Much of the early studies on emotion within the fields of 
social and cognitive psychology, as well as a few studies in political science, have 
modeled emotion in such a fashion. On the other hand, a review of the literature also 
uncovers the fact that there is a separate approach to understanding the nature of 
emotion. Called herein “emotion as emotion,” this approach suggests that 1) negative 
and positive emotions have differential effects on perception and choice and 2) it should 
not necessarily be assumed that emotions exist within some larger cognitive framework; 
i.e. emotions may operate independent of cognitions, as a separate system of 
“perception.” While the exact structure of emotion within this second approach may be 
difficult at times to delineate, it can be safely stated that emotions are conceived as a 
fundamentally different phenomenon from that of evaluation; that emotions serve to 
detect threats and conditions of safety. Drawing from the neurophysiological and 
neuropsychological literature on emotion, this approach has been most widely set forth 
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in the field of political science by Marcus and colleagues in their research on candidate 
evaluation (Marcus 1998, 2000; Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Marcus et al. 1998). 
The tension between these two conceptualizations of emotion has led to a 
difficulty not only in agreeing on a definition of emotion, but also in addressing the 
influence of emotion on politics. Having discerned this potential discrepancy,  it became 
evident that some accounting for the two would be necessary. Both approaches seemed 
to hold valuable information for our understanding of the relationship between emotions 
and foreign policy as sentiments towards some enemy or about some critical 
international event are not only characterized by evaluative components but also by 
more visceral feelings of threat or insecurity. The model that was developed thus made a 
distinction between affect as an evaluative factor lodged within a larger attitudinal 
setting and emotion as separate feeling states. 
The definition of emotion that was the basis of the model relied fundamentally on 
the conceptualization of emotion and cognition as distinct yet related systems. This 
definition suggested that emotions are responses to external stimuli which are perceived 
to impact an individual’s well-being.  These responses are characterized by 
phenomenological, physiological, and behavioral properties and in turn are associated 
either directly or indirectly with structures within the cognitive system. The aggregate 
properties (phenomenological, physiological, behavioral impulses) of emotions become 
labeled experiences (anger, joy, hate, fear) connected directly to event-specific objects 
(e.g. other individuals, groups, states, organizations, or institutions).   
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The model that was developed suggested that, in the presence of negative 
emotions, cognitions about foreign policy and international relations were bounded in 
terms of their content and capacity. It was theorized that emotions have a “thematic” 
effect on the types of items used to interpret events and that this thematic effect results in 
specific processing biases, such as fewer items of information accessed, less time spent 
reviewing information, greater attention to affectively consistent items of information, 
and higher recall of such items. Furthermore, it was posited that the influence of 
negative emotion on capacity and content would have a direct bearing on 1) 
interpretation of foreign policy information and 2) processes and choice about foreign 
policy events. This theory of emotion and foreign policy event interpretation was 
couched within previous research on the Cognitive Calculus model (Geva et al. 2000; 
Geva and Skorick 1999). 
A fundamental difference was suggested to exist between the influence of 
negative affect and negative emotion. It was posited that negative affect acted as an 
evaluative process, providing individuals with a general, valenced orientation towards 
some stimulus. The more complex phenomenon of negative emotion was viewed as 
exerting markedly differing effects upon individuals than negative affect. A dramatic 
step is hypothesized between negative affective evaluation and the occurrence of 
negative emotion which accounts for markedly different effects between the two in how 
individuals make sense of and respond to foreign policy. 
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DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
Two experiments were conducted to address the aforementioned hypotheses: that 
negative emotion has specific impact on the manner in which individuals make sense of 
and respond to foreign policy information, and that these responses differ from 
affectively evaluative cognitions. Two experiments were designed to address the 
differential effects of this negative emotional state and negative affective condition on 1) 
interpretation and 2) choice. 
 
Experiment 1: Event Interpretation 
In terms of event interpretation, or “making sense” of international relations the 
results were supportive of the model with some exceptions. Negative emotions were 
shown to have impacted participants sense of how similar or dissimilar the Manovans 
where, and the extent to which Manovans were likely to resort to negotiation to solve 
their problems. The influence of emotion along these parameters was shown to be 
stronger than similar evaluations by subjects in the negative affect treatment. The results 
also suggested supportive findings in regard to the effect of information on 
interpretation. The experiment showed that subjects having to make sense of this more 
an inconsistent set of mixed information recalled a higher proportion of negative 
information.  The mixed information set was thus viewed as being cognitively more 
demanding to deal with than more consistent sets of negative and positive information. 
Only subjects in the emotion condition displayed this thematic bias in their recall. 
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It should also be noted that our results supported the idea of a dampening or 
standardizing effect of emotion. When comparing inferences derived from the three sets 
of information with different valences, it was found that the emotional state led to a 
smaller “gap” between inferences based on positive as opposed to negative information. 
For example, subjects in the emotional condition, when asked to state how similar or 
trustworthy they believed the Manovans to be, were on average closer together in how 
they scored this characteristic than subjects in either the affective or control conditions. 
Comparing participants in the negative emotion treatment who had reviewed either a set 
of positive information or a set of negative information, it was found that the difference 
between these evaluations was smaller than the difference of evaluations of similar sets 
of information in the negative affect treatment. Our interpretation of this important 
finding as derived from the LoTES model was that emotion has a “standardizing” effect 
on the way people make sense of events.  This finding reinforces the idea of an interplay 
between emotional and cognitive systems, and that negative emotions served to override 
the thematic content of certain types of information. 
The first experiment also produced a set of findings which did not support the 
theory. Namely, it was found that the emotion condition was associated with greater 
processing time of negative information as compared to negative affect. The LoTES 
model suggests an opposite effect. This finding is more troubling in light of a completely 
different effect on processing time found in the second experiment, on in which positive 
information led to more time spent processing information. While an explanation for the 
latter finding is offered below in the discussion of the second experiment, the finding in 
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the first experiment is consistent with the work of Marcus and colleagues who suggest 
that negative affect leads to greater attention. An underlying trend may be an interaction 
between congruency of emotion and information. It was suggested that the emotional 
system “slows down” at times when dealing with consistent information, possibly in 
order to strengthen the link between feelings of threat and associative cognitions. But 
under what conditions would that be the case? Does the cognitive system respond or act 
differently when trying to make sense of an event than when in trying to make a choice? 
It is expected that future research will be able to more closely address this possibility. 
 
Experiment 2: Choice 
Overall our findings in the second experiment were supportive of the hypotheses 
relating a difference in information processing as a function of emotive state.  In terms 
of processing information relating to foreign policy, the findings reported here suggest a 
wide array of effects of negative emotion. Choice was shown to be strongly influenced 
by emotion. Subjects in the emotion condition were more likely to choose force than 
negotiation. On the other hand, the valence of the information set about Manova had no 
effect on decisions for force or negotiation.  It was also found that the amount of 
attention paid to information as measured by recall supported the hypotheses. The recall 
findings also generally confirmed the results of the previous experiment in which only 
participants in a negative emotional state expressed the confirming thematic bias by 
recalling a higher proportion of negative than positive items.  As was the case in the 
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previous experiment, a similar thematic bias for the control and the affect induced 
participants was not found. 
Certain findings were also found within the second experiment to be inconsistent 
with the hypotheses derived from the theory. Despite the fact that a main effect of 
emotion on the number of items accessed was expected, the results reported here showed 
otherwise. Contrary to the first experiment in which mixed information resulted in more 
time spent trying to “make sense” of the inconsistent set, the second experiment showed 
that the interaction between the emotion condition and the mixed set of information 
resulted in fewer items of information accessed than in either the affective or control 
conditions. One possible explanation offered was the choice task itself. In the second 
experiment subjects were required to not only make sense of information, but also to use 
that information for a specific choice. It is possible that this requirement may have 
resulted in an additional emphasis on positive, or explicitly inconsistent, information. In 
this case it may have been that information of a mixed nature was processed in a similar 
fashion as information of a negative—or consistent—nature.  
The choice task may provide an explanation for another inconsistent finding 
regarding the amount of time subjects spent reviewing positive information. It is possible 
that in both cases such information was dealt with swiftly in order to facilitate choice. It 
is also possible that the choice requirement may have made positive information more 
salient and thus resulted in the increased time spent viewing such information. This 
remains a rather puzzling finding, particularly in light of the fact that a similar finding 
was not reproduced in the earlier experiment. Both of these inconsistent findings were 
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found to be difficult to interpret given the hypotheses offered, namely, that the emotion 
condition should result in a similar amount of time spent viewing both positive and 
negative information. Taken as a whole, however, such findings are not interpreted as 
invalidating the entirety of the model, but instead offer further avenues for research. 
 
Case Study 
In general the model’s basic postulate, that emotions interact with cognitions, 
mediating the types of information brought to bear on a matter, and the manner in which 
such information is used, were confirmed by the empirical findings of this research 
program. The case study was an attempt to highlight how these factors might have 
played out in a real-world case at the public level. Comparisons were drawn between the 
highly emotive events of September 11, 2001, and the assumedly affective events 
surrounding the first World Trade Center bombing.  The fundamental difference shown 
to have existed between these two incidents pertained to the use of language to describe 
reactions to them. As one would have expected, the use of emotional language to 
describe September 11th was far more common than that used by the public to describe 
the first World Trade Center attack. However, analysis of letters to the editor and 
editorials in regional newspapers failed to uncover differences between these two 
incidents in terms of the types of inferences made about the perpetrators of these events, 
or in terms of cognitive complexity scores between the two calamities. 
The findings reported within this program of research suggest moderate to strong 
empirical support for the assertion that emotions impact public perceptions of and 
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responses to foreign affairs. In some instances, particularly when analyzing specific 
processes surrounding the use of information en route to a choice, the impact of negative 
emotions appears quite strong. In other instances, for example when attempting to 
discern the role of negative emotions on inferences and attempts to make sense of 
foreign policy, the results should be characterized as mixed. However, the findings at 
this stage strongly support the contention that emotions do play an important role in our 
understanding of international relations and that their effects and overall influence bear 
further investigation. This study is viewed as but an initial step in the direction of 
uncovering more of the mystery surrounding the interplay of cognition and emotion as 
they relate to our understanding of and reactions to foreign affairs.  The overall 
contribution of this research program to our understanding of international relations and 
foreign policy can be thus summarized: 
Evidence supports the general claim that negative emotions influence the manner 
in which individuals make sense of foreign policy and process information about 
important foreign policy events. Furthermore, the evidence reported herein supports the 
assertion that cognitions about important and critical international events such as crises 
and calamities should incorporate the effects of negative emotions into discussions of 
information processing en route to foreign policy choices.  
The findings reported here support the proposition that emotion has a restrictive 
influence on cognitive capacity and content. Negative emotions have a thematic effect 
on the types of foreign policy information attended to by individuals and their amount of 
said information. 
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The research discussed here suggests that previous attempts to equate affect and 
emotion bear further theoretical consideration. If such studies assume that affect is a 
simple evaluative, valenced structure attached to cognitions, then they may be over-
simplifying a more complex and detailed construct. The findings here suggest that there 
is a vast chasm separating general attitudes such as like and dislike from feelings of 
anger or hatred. The implications of this distinction can be found in the aforementioned 
processing of foreign policy information. 
In general, this study strongly suggests that the role of emotions in foreign policy 
bear further consideration. This assertion has been made elsewhere (Crawford 2000) as 
well. The reluctance of researchers and political scientists to address this issue is 
understandable. The theoretical barriers to incorporating emotions seem considerable 
given a history of confusion and contention surrounding this phenomenon. The 
suggestion here is not that this study has somehow resolved this conflict once and for all. 
This research program has merely attempted to point out one approach which might 
prove useful to scholars of international relations in broadening our understanding of the 
factors and processes which lead to foreign policy outcomes. 
 
LINES OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research in this vein will attempt to refine these findings and deal with 
several related problems. The first, and most glaring, problem concerns the link between 
these findings and foreign policy decision making at the elite level. What do these 
findings suggest for our understanding of how or whether emotions affect foreign policy 
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leaders? Do leaders merely manipulate emotions for their own political gain, or do they 
find themselves swept up by emotional tides as we might expect within the general 
public? On the other hand, are the cognitions of foreign policy leaders impervious to 
negative emotions because of more complex and differentiated cognitive systems? It 
would be useful to attempt to initially tackle this issue by finding some representative 
case wherein which some foreign policy leaders appear to have “suffered” from the 
effects of negative emotions, whereas others did not. One such case for future 
consideration would be the responses of various US officials to the Rwandan genocide 
of 1994. An initial review of interviews and writings by elite decision makers associated 
with this crisis suggests that some officials were highly influenced by emotions, whereas 
others were not. What accounts for the differences in such officials? Was it proximity to 
the issue? Were members of the African desk at the State Department more vulnerable to 
the effects of negative emotions than members of the NSC, or members of the UN 
Security Council?  Could the different responses be chalked up to idiosyncratic 
differences in personality? Attempting to uncover initial hypotheses within a case such 
as this would provide directions for future research on this larger question. 
A second question derived from this study deals with emotion as a dependent 
variable. Given the many studies of the cognitive elements associated with important 
international relations, schema, images, situations, actors, actions, etc., one is left 
wondering what circumstances or conditions are most salient for our understanding of 
how negative emotions arise within the context of foreign policy decision making. In our 
attempt to understand foreign affairs on a daily basis, are observers more likely to have 
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negative feelings about some types of situations more than others? Are certain actor 
characteristics more likely to give rise to hatred, anger, loathing and anxiety? Is there 
some combination or sequence of actor and action qualities which generates strong 
emotions? 
An additional question which has bears investigation concerns the relationship 
between cognitive complexity and the effects of negative emotion. In the case study in 
Section 7 it was assumed that negative emotions would damped cognitive complexity 
because this hypothesis fit within the overall framework of the theory discussed earlier. 
Cognitive complexity thus becomes yet another measure which one might use to 
uncover the influence of emotions. The hypotheses about how emotions might impact 
measures of cognitive complexity have already been stated. Further research might 
attempt to look at this question more closely in an experimental setting using a similar 
approach to that described here. Participants could be asked to view a film clip about 
some noteworthy news event and then write a brief paragraph describing that event. 
Using measures of cognitive complexity we would hypothesize that subjects within the 
emotional treatment would exhibit lower scores than other subjects. Such research would 
serve to bolster and enhance the findings discussed here. 
Finally, a study of emotion should take advantage of recent developments in the 
field of event data analysis. Current programs in use such as KEDS and Tabari (Schrodt 
1993, 1994, 1995, 2000) allow researchers to automatically code large amounts of 
information gleaned from international news sources. While much, if not most, of these 
sources suffer from the same editorial non-emotiveness which was found in the analysis 
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of the first and second World Trade Center attacks, are there semantic markers which 
indicate the presence of emotions surrounding some issue? A study of events from the 
past several decades might suggest a sequence or pattern of language used to indicate the 
presence of negative emotions. Furthermore, given the presence of such feelings, what 
types of actions, descriptions, and policies are most common? What states or regions of 
the world are most often beset by emotionally laden conflicts? Are “enduring rivalries” 
(c.f. Maoz and Mor 2005) best explained by their emotional content rather than specific 
conflictual issues? Event data analysis seems a useful and beneficial tool for further 
explication of this research program. 
A Yiddish proverb states that, “the heart is half a prophet.” We can no more 
separate emotions from our lives than we can divorce ourselves from breathing; 
emotions are an integral part of the individual and social human experience. For 
centuries poets and prophets have grasped the essential idea that emotions have a 
profound, and often times appalling, influence on the actions we take and the choices we 
make. However, pithy sayings and proverbs are not generally the sources of good 
scientific investigation. What has been set forth here is a study which has moved that 
which is believed to be intuitively—that emotions influence how we make sense of and 
respond to international relations—from the category of hunch to that of empirical 
knowledge. It is believed that further research will continue to peel back layer upon layer 
of this intriguing and highly relevant phenomena in our study of foreign policy decision 
making.
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
 Marcus and his colleagues conceive of two emotionality systems: a threat-attendant 
system and an enthusiasm generating system.  The threat attendant system monitors the 
environment and creates feelings ranging from safety to anxiety.  The mood state system 
monitors current behavior and successes to generate feelings ranging from depression to 
enthusiasm (Marcus and MacKuen 1993). 
 
2
 See Geva et al. (2000) for a more detailed explanation. 
 
3
 While acknowledging the limitation of such a simplification, we stand in unison with 
several other research efforts that utilized the same simplification (Bueno de Mesquita 
and Lalman 1990, 1992; James and Oneal 1991; Morrow 1997; Ostrom and Job 1986). 
 
4
 The model can deal with two modes of exposure to information. The first mode 
addresses situation where the decision-maker has minimal control on the sequencing of 
information to which she/he is exposed. This is the mode that is represented later in the 
experimental test. In the second mode the decision-maker has control over the flow of 
information, i.e., the decision maker defines specifically and actively searches for certain 
items in a certain order. Geva and colleagues posit that in reality information acquisition 
contains a mixture of the two modes.  
 
5
 In this sense the definition of relevance comes close to the notion of diagnosticity of 
information as addressed by Bassok and Trope (1983-4). Schwartz and Norman 
(1989:356) state that relevance "refers to the implicational relationship between a cue 
and judgment" (see also Anderson 1981). 
 
6
 Decision-makers must believe that the information is reliable or credible if they are to 
incorporate the information into a decision calculus (cf. Jervis 1976). Similar emphasis 
on the reliability of the information or beliefs is included both in Taber’s  (1992)  POLI,  
an expert system in IR, and in Young’s (1998) “Worldview”. However, in their 
formulations they refer to it as confidence. 
 
7
 Moreover, as illustrated by Taber (1992:889) "decision makers must generate 
meaningful representations of new information before that information can be used in 
reasoning, that is, they must interpret incoming information." 
 
8
 All the posteriori contrasts (using Scheffe) are significant. 
 
9
 The news clip consist of actual news footage taken from the US involvement in 
Somalia, and the subsequent dragging of a US soldier’s body through the streets of 
Mogadishu by Somalis in October of 1993. 
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10
 The recall coding of an item addresses accuracy as a retrieval of the main gist of the 
information item. 
 
11
 The news clip consist of actual news footage taken from the US involvement in 
Somalia, and the subsequent dragging of a US soldier’s body through the streets of 
Mogadishu by Somalians in October of 1993. 
 
12
 http://www.thesaurus.com 
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